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52 
PLAYING AROUND HART AND KELLER’S  
FULL-COURT PRESS: 
DESIGNING A FEDERAL COMPULSORY 
LICENSING REGIME FOR RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY 
THAT ENABLES DEVELOPERS AND 
COMPENSATES RIGHTS HOLDERS 
 
WILL BUCHER

 
 
Two right of publicity cases concerning Electronic Arts’ NCAA 
Football video game series, Hart and Keller, have held that those games 
infringe the rights of publicity of the athletes they depict, effectively ending 
the franchise.  While both decisions featured a thoughtful dissent, neither 
the majority nor minority opinions offered an interpretation of right of 
publicity law that, in practice, results in athletes being paid for their 
likeness.  This article joins other scholars in concluding that a compulsory 
licensing regime for rights of publicity would provide a way to remedy the 
inconsistency between the effects of Hart and Keller and the historical and 
economic underpinnings of right of publicity law.  This article then 
presents the first comprehensive proposal for what such a compulsory 
licensing regime would look like.  By examining existing compulsory 
licensing regimes for other forms of intellectual property, assessing the 
specific challenges that exist in adopting a similar regime in the context of 
rights of publicity, and analyzing the effective compensation rates observed 
in recent comparable transactions, this article presents a complete and 
actionable structure for such a regime.  Specifically, this article concludes 
that an effective compulsory licensing regime for rights of publicity should: 
allow, but not require, interactive entertainment developers to opt-in to the 
system; make the system available only to works depicting more than forty 
likenesses outside of a fixed narrative; provide an exemption for 
organizations that successfully aggregate and license large numbers of 
rights of publicity; fix compensation at 5% of gross revenue; and distribute 
the collected funds through a flexible committee system. 
                                                          

 Will Bucher graduated with honors from the University of Chicago School of Law in 2015 and 
is currently an associate at Debevoise & Plimpton.  The author would like to give special thanks 
to Professor Randal Picker for his advice and guidance in the initial drafting of this article. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In its final installment, Electronic Art’s (“EA”) video game series 
NCAA Football sold nearly two million copies.
1
  Today, the series is 
canceled.  It was not canceled because it was unpopular or unprofitable.  
Instead, it was canceled because two circuit court decisions—Hart and 
Keller—leave EA and other video game developers with no feasible way to 
make historically accurate simulations like NCAA Football without 
violating right of publicity law.
2
  While the First Amendment protects most 
expressive uses—even those uses that incorporate the image or likeness of 
another person—the rulings in Hart and Keller held that the video games 
were not sufficiently expressive or transformative to avoid running afoul of 
right of publicity law absent licenses from the rights holders.
3
  Given the 
sheer number of rights involved and the potential for opportunistic holdout 
on the part of rights holders, this is a feat that can be accomplished only in 
fiction.  Whatever one might think of the legal analysis, the Hart and Keller 
decisions represent a remedy that is worse than the disease, ensuring that 
these simulations go unmade and, in turn, that rights holders go 
uncompensated.
4
  This article explains how we got here: to a place where 
all players lose, whether they are holding a controller or a ball.  It also 
suggests an immediate solution: a compulsory licensing regime that would 
allow developers to make their games and allow compensation for depicted 
persons’ rights of publicity. 
Technological advancement often outpaces legal advancement.  As 
this article explains, there is no interpretation of existing right of publicity 
law that allows for a disorganized, large group of individuals, like NCAA 
athletes, to receive compensation for nontransformative depictions of their 
                                                          
1.  Game Database: Global Sales of NCAA Games, VGCHARTZ, 
http://www.vgchartz.com/gamedb/?name=NCAA [http://perma.cc/U2JX-ZQEU]. 
  
2.  See generally Elec. Arts Inc. v. Keller, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 
717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013); In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 
724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 
3.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1279 (“The district court was correct in 
concluding that EA cannot prevail as a matter of law based on the transformative use defense at 
the anti-SLAPP stage.”); Hart, 717 F.3d at 169 (applying the transformative use test and 
determining that “while we recognize the creative energies necessary for crafting the various 
elements of NCAA Football that are not tied directly to reality, we hold that they have no legal 
significance in our instant decision”). 
 
4.  See generally Keller, 135 S. Ct. 42; Hart, 717 F.3d 141; In re NCAA Student-Athlete 
Litig., 724 F.3d 1268. 
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likenesses in a video game or other work.  To create a system that allows 
both nontransformative simulation works to be created and rights holders to 
be compensated, we must look towards old solutions and enact new laws.  
The music and television industries have established compulsory licenses 
to address similar market failures in the past, but to date, such licenses have 
not touched rights of publicity.  As new forms of entertainment—namely 
nontransformative sports simulation games—test our understanding of the 
right of publicity and its impact, a compulsory license system presents 
itself as one solution to the problem.  Establishing a compulsory license for 
the rights of publicity brings new benefits and challenges: to be effective, 
the system must account not only for the efficiencies it seeks to promote, 
but also for the many opportunities for misuse that may come with it. 
The bulk of this article sets about that task.  It proposes a system that 
limits the compulsory license for rights of publicity to works that depict a 
large number of rights holders outside a set narrative.  It also proposes a 
system where licensing can continue as it does today where it has proven 
feasible and where it falls short, to resort to a federal compulsory licensing 
regime.  This article recognizes that unlike other compulsory licensing 
systems, there can be no one-size-fits-all model for distributing royalties 
and thereby utilizes a committee system for making that determination.  
This article considers the costs, benefits, and political implications of 
different structural decisions.  In doing so, it presents a full and functional 
recommendation for a federal compulsory licensing regime for rights of 
publicity. 
 
II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
 
This section introduces the history and the law surrounding rights of 
publicity.  First, this section provides a brief background on the emergence 
of the right of publicity.  Second, it details the decisions in Hart and Keller.  
Rather than arguing that the decisions were or were not correctly decided, 
this article points out that no matter the decision of the court, our legal 
system leaves athletes without a feasible way to receive compensation for 
their talent, ability, and publicity.  Even assuming athletes are willing to 
license their rights, drafting and negotiating thousands of separate licenses 
is likely to be a prohibitive cost to developers.  Third, this section discusses 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
5
 the sole United States 
                                                          
5.  See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
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Supreme Court case addressing the right of publicity.
6
  This article explains 
why Zacchini provides little practical guidance to the courts in Hart and 
Keller but argues that it does provide policymakers with a comprehensive 
understanding of right of publicity values and what the right of publicity 
intends to promote.  Finally, this section reviews the scholarship 
surrounding the right of publicity, including scholarship calling for federal 
reforms or advocates the enactment of a compulsory licensing regime. 
 
A. The Emergence of the Right of Publicity 
 
In jurisdictions where it exists, the right of publicity grants all persons 
limited control over the use of their likeness even when their actions 
intentionally place them in the public eye.
7
  By the middle of the 20th 
century, courts had firmly established that individuals had some right to be 
left alone—i.e., a right of privacy—although the bounds of that right were, 
and still are, not clearly defined.
8
  One of the struggles that courts faced as 
the right of privacy doctrine developed was whether and how privacy rights 
applied to those who intentionally placed themselves in the spotlight.
9
  
Because the traditional values underlying a right to privacy, such as 
protecting the person from unwanted intrusion and disclosure, are greatly 
diminished for those who voluntarily subject themselves to public 
exposure, the initial reaction by courts was to suggest that no privacy rights 
exist for public figures.
10
 
In 1953, Judge Jerome Frank coined the term “right of publicity,” 
                                                          
6.  The Supreme Court has only ever mentioned the right of publicity in two cases.  The 
other case, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, only mentions the right of publicity in a 
parenthetical citing Zacchini.  See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988). 
 
7.  RUDOLF CALLMANN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND 
MONOPOLIES § 22:32 (4th ed. 2010) (“By contrast, a right of publicity action is designed for 
individuals who have placed themselves in the public eye.  It secures for them the exclusive right 
to exploit the commercial value that attaches to their identities by virtue of their celebrity.”). 
 
8.  See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the 
Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 958 (1989) (“The origins of the tort of invasion of 
privacy lie in a famous article on The Right to Privacy published in 1890 by Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis.”). 
 
9.  See THOMAS PHILLIP BOGGESS V, CAUSES OF ACTION FOR AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE 
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY § 121.2 (2016). 
 
10.  Id.; see O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 1941); Pallas v. 
Crowley-Milner & Co., 54 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Mich. 1952). 
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thereby breaking away from the then-emerging jurisprudence limiting the 
access of celebrities to privacy torts.
11
  Judge Frank distinguished the 
dispute before him from other privacy rights cases, stating: 
 
It is common knowledge that many prominent persons 
(especially actors and ball-players), far from having their 
feelings bruised through public exposure of their 
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer 
received money for authorizing advertisements, 
popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, 
magazines, busses, trains and subways.  This right of 
publicity would usually yield them no money unless it 
could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which 
barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.
12
 
 
A year later, the first academic work on the right of publicity was 
published.
13
  In the years to follow, academic literature began to formally 
distinguish the right of publicity from traditional privacy torts.
14
  
Jurisdictions that recognize both of these causes of action now distinguish 
these rights.
15
  While the right of privacy protects against intrusion, 
disclosure, and false light like any privacy action, the right of publicity also 
protects against the misappropriation of a person’s image.
16
  With this 
additional protection, many states established the right either by common 
law or statute.
17
  Today, 29 states recognize the right in some form.
18
 
                                                          
11.  See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d 
Cir. 1953); see also BOGGESS, supra note 9.  
 
12.  Haelan Laboratories, Inc., 202 F.2d at 868. 
 
13.  BOGGESS, supra note 9. 
 
14.  See, e.g., Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzeti Imp. & Exp., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 325 (6th 
Cir. 2001) (“Although the right of publicity is an outgrowth of the right of privacy, the two rights 
‘protect fundamentally different interests and must be analyzed separately.’”).  
 
15.  Id. 
 
16.  BOGGESS, supra note 9. 
 
17.  Id. 
 
18.  Id. 
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B. Recent Right of Publicity Litigation Surrounding the Use of NCAA 
Athletes in Video Games 
 
The past few years have seen a flurry of parallel litigation relating to 
the use of NCAA athlete’s likenesses in video games.  The federal circuits 
decided three cases in 2013 regarding EA’s catalog of sports simulations, 
which made unlicensed use of athlete’s likenesses.
19
  One case, Brown v. 
Electronic Arts, Inc., was brought as a Lanham Act claim and was 
dismissed.
20
  However, the other two cases were brought under a right of 
publicity theory and were permitted to move forward by two-to-one 
decisions in the Third and Ninth Circuits.
21
  As discussed further below, the 
effect of these cases’ holdings is that under right of publicity law, game 
developers must compensate current and former NCAA athletes for the use 
of their likenesses in the creative works the developers produce at rates 
individually negotiated with each and every person depicted.
22
 
The Keller and Hart decisions both addressed whether the uses of the 
individual athletes’ likenesses are protected by the First Amendment and 
specifically, whether the transformative use test was met in regard to the 
use of the likenesses in the work.
23
  The transformative use test, as applied 
to right of publicity cases, allows the creator of a work to use another’s 
likeness so long as he or she transforms it in a way that it becomes part of 
his or her own expression.
24
  As phrased by the court in Hart (quoting the 
Supreme Court of California), the critical question is “whether the product 
                                                          
19.  See generally Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013); Hart v. Elec. 
Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013); In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 
20.  See Brown, 724 F.3d at 1247–48.  
 
21.  See Elec. Arts Inc. v. Hart (Hart Dismissal), 717 F.3d 141, 163 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. 
dismissed, 135 S. Ct. 43 (2014); In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1276.    
 
22.  See Hart, 717 F.3d at 151; In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1281.  
 
23.  See Hart, 717 F.3d at 163; In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1281.  
 
24.  CALLMANN, supra note 7 (“The defendant is entitled to summary judgment upon a 
showing that its work ‘adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering 
the first with new expression, meaning, or message,’ that it is ‘transformative.’”) (citing Kirby v. 
Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Ct. App. 2006)). 
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containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become 
primarily the defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s 
likeness.”
25
  The court in Keller concluded that in EA’s video games it did 
not so transform the likeness, stating “EA’s use of Keller’s likeness does 
not contain significant transformative elements such that EA is entitled to 
the [transformative use First Amendment] defense.”
26
  The court in Hart 
concluded the same, reasoning that “[t]he digital Ryan Hart does what the 
actual Ryan Hart did while at Rutgers: he plays college football, in digital 
recreations of college football stadiums, filled with all the trappings of a 
college football game.  This is not transformative [. . .].”
27
 
While largely agreeing on the transformative use test’s applicability 
and functioning, the dissenting judges found that the requirements of the 
test had been met and the likenesses were sufficiently transformed.
28
  These 
opinions noted that the entire work contained substantial transformative 
elements.  Both decisions made reference to the games’ “dynasty” and 
“campus legend” modes, which allow the user to create a wholly fictional 
character or coach and control that avatar’s career, effectively turning the 
work into a historical fiction where the user’s fictional team faces the real 
teams and players of the time period.
29
  The opinions also posited that a 
rule that penalized realism and commercial success was essentially 
penalizing the creators for their immense talent.
30
  As Judge Thomas noted 
in Keller, “I would not punish EA for the realism of its games and for the 
skill of the artists who created realistic settings for the football games.”
31
  
Judge Ambro, too, was zealous in defending the right to turn a profit by 
engaging in First Amendment activity: “The First Amendment extends 
protection to biographies, documentaries, docudramas, and other 
expressive works depicting real-life figures, whether the accounts are 
factual or fictional.”
32
  He went on to note that under Brown, video games 
                                                          
25.  Hart, 717 F.3d at 160. 
 
26.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1276. 
 
27.  Hart, 717 F.3d at 166. 
 
28.  See id. at 175; In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1289. 
 
29.  See Hart, 717 F.3d at 175; In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1271–72. 
 
30.  Hart, 717 F.3d at 173; In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1287. 
 
31.  Hart, 717 F.3d at 173; In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1287. 
 
32.  Hart, 717 F.3d at 173. 
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were entitled to the full-unbridled range of First Amendment protection.
33
  
For these reasons and others, Judges Thomas and Ambro ultimately 
concluded that while “the public’s perception of fairness” might suggest 
otherwise, EA was entitled to First Amendment protection for their 
accurate depictions of athletes in their games.
34
 
This article does not take a position on the correctness of these rulings 
under current law.  Rather, it points out the stark choice these courts face 
when choosing an interpretation of the law.  If these courts had reached the 
opposite result, they would have preserved the ability of innovative game 
developers to create and sell games based on these current and former 
teams and players.  These games would be enjoyed by millions of fans and 
possibly generate substantial revenue for the game developers.  The 
persons depicted—the athletes who put in the work and time to become 
skilled athletes—however, would receive nothing. 
Under the Ninth and Third Circuits’ rulings, however, game 
developers are required to carefully consider whether their use of 
historically accurate athletes’ likenesses in simulation sports games is 
transformative enough to be protected under the First Amendment and, if it 
is not, to locate, negotiate with, and pay for licenses from every rights 
holder whose likeness they use in that historically accurate simulation.
35
  
That task is practically impossible and it is far more likely that such games 
will simply never be made.  These games include thousands of players, 
some of whom are alive, some of whom are dead and, of the deceased 
players, some of whom do not have postmortem publicity rights and some 
of whom who do, which are ultimately owned by heirs (knowingly or 
unknowingly).
36
  Tracking all of these people down would be a logistical 
challenge and a cost-prohibitive task.  Even then, players could 
opportunistically holdout, demanding a large sum of money from 
                                                          
 
33.  Id. at 173–74. 
 
34.  Id. at 171. 
 
35.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete Litig., 724 F.3d at 1270–71 (acknowledging that video 
games “are entitled to the full protections of the First Amendment” yet holding that certain 
celebrity uses, like those in the NCAA series, could still be violations of rights of publicity); 
Hart, 717 F.3d at 163 (adopting the transformative use test because it is “flexible” and delineating 
no bright line rules for developers to follow in the future). 
 
36.  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 6:3 (2d ed. 
2016) (“About 20 states recognize a right of publicity in the identity of a deceased person.”). 
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developers or requiring mechanics concessions (e.g., “my avatar must be 
the fastest in the game”).  For video games that aim to show the full, 
historically accurate roster for every team, it would only require a few 
similarly motivated players to destroy any hope of securing the rights 
required for a game by holding out and demanding an unreasonably high 
price or by refusing to license their rights entirely.  The result would be that 
game developers could no longer create these sorts of realistic simulations 
and millions of consumers could no longer purchase a product they desire.  
And the persons depicted, the athletes who put in the work and time to 
become skilled athletes?  They still receive nothing. 
As discussed in greater detail in the next section, the purpose 
underlying the right of publicity is to ensure that people are compensated, 
not to limit what is published.
37
  Therefore, the economic and social failure 
resulting from these legal decisions calls for a legislative solution.
38
  In 
economic terms, the ruling could be described as Pareto pessimal, which is 
to say it hurts one or more groups without helping anyone.  Just as a Pareto 
optimal improvement is always desirable, a Pareto pessimal one can never 
be.
39
  But when viewed in regard to the fundamental values embodied in 
the right of publicity, both the Third and Ninth Circuits’ majority positions 
and those of their dissenting judges seem wrong.  Neither interpretation 
offered by either side accomplishes this result going forward.
40
  If right of 
publicity statutes are “correctly” read as generating a dichotomous choice 
of this nature, then the law needs to be amended to provide more options 
for developers, athletes and judges alike. 
Most people can agree that game developers should be able to create 
                                                          
37.  Id.  
 
38.  While it is conceivable that future court decisions will remedy this problem, more 
recent court decisions indicate that this is very unlikely.  In O’Bannon v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, litigation which was parallel to Hart and Keller in attacking the NCAA’s 
amateurism rules on antitrust grounds, the district court ruled that universities had to allow 
players to collect up to $5,000.00 a year in compensation for the use of their rights of publicity by 
universities.  O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1007−08 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014).  This opened the door for developers to obtain the necessary licenses through 
universities, a somewhat less cumbersome process than going athlete by athlete.  However, on 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit overturned this part of the ruling, holding “the district court’s[] remedy, 
allowing students to be paid cash compensation of up to $5,000 per year, was erroneous.”  
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 
39.  See, e.g., id. at 1007–08. 
 
40.  See supra Section II.B (explaining why neither interpretation fosters a world in which 
athletes receive compensation for their likenesses).   
 
ELR – Bucher (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2017  5:09 PM 
2016] PLAYING AROUND HART AND KELLER’S FULL-COURT PRESS 61 
 
fun, innovative, and captivating games without being legally constrained in 
such a way that makes doing so, as a practical matter, impossible.  Most 
people would also be comfortable providing athletes and other public 
figures depicted in video games reasonable compensation for the use of 
their name and likeness.  Assuming these statements are both true, then the 
relevant question is not “were Hart and Keller correctly decided?” but 
instead, “how can we create a regime that satisfies both of these wishes 
meaningfully and simultaneously?”   
 
C. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. 
 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. is the only United 
States Supreme Court case addressing the right of publicity.
41
  Zacchini 
considered whether a human cannonball performance by Zacchini could be 
broadcast without a license by a local television station.
42
  The Supreme 
Court of Ohio found that Zacchini’s “right of publicity” could not trump a 
local television station’s right under the First Amendment to broadcast the 
news, even if it showed footage of the entire fifteen-second act.
43
  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the First Amendment 
did indeed bar the state of Ohio from limiting the use of the film for 
journalistic purposes through its “right of publicity.”  Based on this 
procedural posture, the United States Supreme Court found that it did not.
44
 
However, this “right of publicity” claim may have been better 
handled under unfair competition law, where the right of producers to 
protect the value of their performance by excluding third-party copying is, 
and was at the time of the decision, firmly established.
45
  As various news 
outlets noted in their amicus brief in support of rehearing en banc for the 
EA right of publicity cases: 
                                                          
41.  See Hart, 717 F.3d at 152 (“We begin our inquiry by looking at Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., the only Supreme Court case addressing the First Amendment in a 
right of publicity context.”). 
 
42.  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 562 (1977). 
 
43.  Id. 
 
44.  Id. at 579. 
 
45.  See generally Nat’l Exhibition Co. v. Fass, 143 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Sw. 
Broad. Co. v. Oil Ctr. Broad. Co., 210 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. 
v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938).  
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[T]he Supreme Court’s rationale for protecting Zacchini’s 
proprietary rights is clearly grounded in his role as the 
producer of his show, not because his image appeared on 
television.  The Court emphasized that Zacchini was 
entitled to the same basket of rights as other event 
producers, including not only the right to license 
broadcasting rights to his entire event, but also the right to 
charge admission fees—something plainly only event 
producers can do.
46
 
 
Thus, Zacchini is best seen as a case maintaining the ability of those who 
invest time in creating creative works and performances from having those 
efforts copied wholesale, rather than one limiting the scope of the First 
Amendment where a person’s right of publicity is involved.  As the Court 
stated: 
 
It is evident, and there is no claim here to the contrary, that 
petitioner’s state-law right of publicity would not serve to 
prevent respondent from reporting the newsworthy facts 
about petitioner’s act [but] the Constitution no more 
prevents a State from requiring respondent to compensate 
petitioner for broadcasting his act on television than it 
would privilege respondent to film and broadcast a 
copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the 
copyright owner.
47
 
 
The awkward procedural posture of Zacchini—coming to the United 
States Supreme Court as a right of publicity claim
48
 rather than an unfair 
competition claim—makes it a frustratingly poor case for deciding the 
recent litigation surrounding the rights of NCAA athletes.  However, from 
a policymaker’s standpoint, it is quite useful in understanding the values 
that underlie the right of publicity and in turn, provides guidance on what 
                                                          
46.  Motion for Leave to File a Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing En 
Banc by Advance Publications, et al. at 11, Davis v. Elec. Arts Inc., 775 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 
2015) (No. 12-15737). 
 
47.  Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574–75. 
 
48.  Id. at 564–65. 
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legislatures and judges should aim to achieve when drafting and 
interpreting the right of publicity.  Zacchini makes two critical points on 
this matter: (1) the right of publicity protects similar interests as patent and 
copyright law and (2) unlike the privacy torts that are the right of 
publicity’s historic predecessors, the right of publicity does not shield a 
person from publicity; instead, it promotes compensation for it.
49
 
The Zacchini opinion makes multiple comparisons between the right 
of publicity and other forms of intellectual property protection.  It states: 
“the State’s interest is closely analogous to the goals of patent and 
copyright law.”
50
  Later, the Court goes on to state “[the] same 
consideration[s] underlie [the right of publicity as] the patent and copyright 
laws long enforced by this Court.”
51
  It is clear that the Zacchini Court felt 
that the right of publicity was a closely analogous right with other 
intellectual property protections and in part for this reason, found that the 
First Amendment could not eviscerate this new right, at least in situations 
where the plaintiff might well have brought the claim under a more 
traditional intellectual property theory.
52
  As policymakers, this analogy 
should be our first signpost on how to resolve the current conflict between 
the creative rights of game developers and the publicity rights of famous 
persons.  The past three decades have shown a rapid legislative response to 
the challenges faced in administering copyrights in a digital world.
53
  
Organizations like the American Society of Composers, Authors, and 
Publishers (“ASCAP”) quickly, cheaply, and effectively collect and 
distribute royalties to and from thousands of entities, allowing artists and 
application developers alike to be compensated in the new media 
landscape.
54
 
Second, the opinion makes it clear that the right of publicity is meant 
to promote, not inhibit, the public use of people’s images and likenesses.
55
  
                                                          
49.  Id. at 576.  
 
50.  Id. at 573.  
 
51.  Id. at 576. 
 
52.  Id. 
 
53.  See generally 2015 Annual Report, ASCAP 1 (2015), 
http://www.ascap.com/about/annualreport.aspx [http://perma.cc/7QJT-CZ9G].  
 
54.  See 2015 Annual Report, supra note 51 (noting that they collected over $1 billion in 
revenue and have “one of the lowest overhead operating rates in the world at 12.3%”). 
 
55.  Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.  
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The right of publicity was not established to protect a person from being 
thrust into the public eye, “focusing [instead] on the right of the individual 
to reap the reward of his endeavors and having little to do with protecting 
feelings or reputation.”
56
  The court goes on to state matter-of-factly that 
“[t]he rationale for” protecting the right of publicity “is the straightforward 
one of preventing unjust enrichment [. . .].”
57
  In reference to Ohio’s 
rationale for establishing the right in the first place, the Court summarizes 
that “Ohio’s decision to protect petitioner’s right of publicity here rests on 
[both] a desire to compensate the performer for the time and effort invested 
in his act [and to] provide[] an economic incentive for him to make the 
investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public.”
58
  
The court is clear that this is not a case about what a person can say; it is a 
case about who they have to pay.
59
  Like all intellectual property, the right 
of publicity aims to encourage the creation of valuable works, not 
extinguish them.
60
 
Both of these principles suggest that where the right of publicity 
ceases to promote the creation of valuable speech—where, like in the Hart 
and Keller decisions, the court’s holdings resulted in fewer profitable uses 
of a person’s likeness—the right should be amended so that it properly 
effectuates its goals.  This article proposes such an amendment.  It details 
how a federal compulsory licensing regime for rights of publicity 
(“FCLRRP”) would allow both developers and depicted persons to profit 
from the use of their likenesses, an outcome that is functionally impossible 
under both the prevailing and dissenting opinions in Hart and Keller. 
 
D. Current Proposals to Modify the Right of Publicity System 
                                                          
 
56.  Id. at 573 (The right of publicity tort was compared to the tort of “false light.”  In 
doing so, it reiterates the desire for publication.  The Court states: “In ‘false light’ cases the only 
way to protect the interests involved is to attempt to minimize publication of the damaging matter 
while in ‘right of publicity’ cases, the only question is who gets to do the publishing.”). 
 
57.  Id. at 576. 
 
58.  Id. 
 
59.  Id.  
 
60.  See, e.g., Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (stating “the fundamental and complementary purposes of both the intellectual 
property and antitrust laws, [is] to ‘encourag[e] innovation, industry and competition.’”) (citing 
generally Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
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Before addressing this article’s proposal, it is worth pausing to 
consider those proposals found in other scholarship.  The decisions in 
Keller and Hart have sparked a moderate body of literature.
61
  Many of 
these scholarly articles suggest using a federal regime to replace the ad hoc 
state-level administration of rights of publicity.
62
  With a single notable 
exception, these scholars suggest simply imposing either a speech-
protective or celebrity-protective rule at the federal level, which provides 
no better solution than the choices facing the judges in Hart and Keller. 
On the speech-protective side, Alex Wyman suggests “we need a 
federal right of publicity not just to clarify the mess of laws on the subject, 
but also to restrain the right to prevent it from impinging on our 
constitutional rights any further.”
63
  Jon M. Garon proposes a regime that 
clearly defines video games out of the “commercial speech” category and 
“then builds upon . . . existing regulatory framework[s]” such as the FCC 
“to suggest a reformulation of publicity rights that are consistent with the 
Constitution, the interests of the public, and the rights of individuals to 
control their rights of publicity.”
64
  Susannah M. Rooney would create “[a] 
federal right of publicity under the Lanham Act,” which both the text of her 
article and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brown suggest would mean that 
game developers would be free to create games on the order of the NCAA 
series without compensating players.
65
 
Conversely, Talor Bearman believes “Congress needs to pass a right-
of-publicity statute providing a comprehensive cause of action for all US 
citizens” and thinks that the length of that right should mirror copyright 
                                                          
61.  See Alex Wyman, Defining the Modern Right of Publicity, 15 TEX. REV. ENT. & 
SPORTS L. 167, 175 (2014).  See generally J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY 
AND PRIVACY § 11:50 (2d ed. 2016); Lee Levine & Steven Wermiel, The Court and the 
Cannonball: An Inside Look, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 607 (2016); Mark Conrad, A New First 
Amendment Goal Line Defense—Stopping the Right of Publicity Defense, 40 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
743 (2014). 
 
62.  See Conrad, supra note 61, at 743; Levine, supra note 61, at 607; Wyman, supra note 
61, at 175.  See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 61.  
 
63.  Wyman, supra note 61, at 175. 
 
64.  Jon M. Garon, Beyond the First Amendment: Shaping the Contours of Commercial 
Speech in Video Games, Virtual Worlds, and Social Media, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 607, 609 (2012). 
 
65.  Susannah M. Rooney, Note, Just Another Brown-Eyed Girl: Toward a Limited 
Federal Right of Publicity Under the Lanham Act in a Digital Age of Celebrity Dominance, 86 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 921, 924 (2013). 
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protections.
66
  Similarly, Alex J. Berger would unify, but not fundamentally 
modify, the right of publicity under a federal regime that “would reinforce 
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning pre-Keller.”
67
  Whichever side of the coin 
these scholars fall on, their arguments, by and large, simply rehash those of 
the attorneys in Hart and Keller.  Federal reform is needed, but there is 
little sense in asking our legislatures to simply pick a side in that false 
dichotomy. 
One pair of scholars, David Frankly and Adam Kuhn, appear to be 
exceptional in their recognition of the problem, if perhaps a little too 
ambitious in their solution.  They astutely note that “[t]he current state of 
the law contrives an artificial dichotomy—property vs. speech—in uses of 
celebrity images that plainly fails to accommodate reality.”
68
  They go on 
to propose that free speech jurisprudence shift, to allow for a form of ex 
post judicial compulsory licensing, under which the Constitution 
guaranteed all persons the right to use any person’s image, but might have 
to pay a portion of the revenue as decided by the judge.
69
  They suggest that 
“we must allow judges to honestly deal with the underlying economic 
issues.”
70
 
A wholesale overhaul of free speech jurisprudence to accommodate 
the economic realities of the modern world is almost certainly a bridge too 
far, but the basic premise of creating a system that, in a meaningful way, 
allows for game developers to purchase the rights of publicity en masse 
from rights holders for something approximating fair market value is spot 
on.  At its conception, the right of publicity was about ensuring 
compensation,
71
 and a federal regime should be implemented to ensure that 
purpose is effected. 
While Frankly and Kuhn are the only scholars who have yet to 
suggest any form of mandatory licensing for rights of publicity to remedy 
                                                          
66.  Talor Bearman, Note, Intercepting Licensing Rights: Why College Athletes Need a 
Federal Right of Publicity, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 85, 107 (2012). 
 
67.  Alex J. Berger, Note, Righting the Wrong of Publicity: A Novel Proposal for a 
Uniform Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 845, 867 (2015). 
 
68.  David Frankly & Adam Kuhn, Owning Oneself in a World of Others: Towards a 
Paid-for First Amendment, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 977, 981 (2014). 
 
69.  See id. at 979.  
 
70.  Id. at 1015. 
 
71.  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977). 
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the tension created by Keller and Hart,
72
 scholarship contemplating the 
possibility of a FCLRRP goes back to at least the late 1980s.
73
  Eugene 
Salomon appears to be the first scholar to contemplate the use of a 
compulsory licensing system as part of a federal right of publicity but 
ultimately rejects it, in large part because of fears that a compulsory 
scheme would prohibit exclusivity agreements necessary for rights holders 
to obtain fair compensation.
74
  He suggests that rights of publicity should 
always be licensed voluntarily but that to protect free speech, they should 
only apply to commercial works.
75
  Presumably, he did not anticipate the 
challenges courts in cases like Keller would face in distinguishing between 
what was and what was not a commercial use.
76
 
The suggestion of a FCLRRP reemerged in the early 1990s.
77
  Apart 
from an article that mentions it in a single sentence as a possible solution to 
right of publicity issues,
78
 the next scholar to tackle the issue was Pamela 
Lynn Kunath.  Kunath approached the issue from the perspective of using 
computer-generated imagery to create realistic likenesses of famous 
actors.
79
  While most of the work is dedicated to deciphering the issue 
under the present legal framework, Kunath briefly suggests that 
compulsory licensing may be a solution to the problem.
80
  Like Salomon, 
Kunath is concerned about balancing exclusivity rights with the ability of 
creators to access a person’s image, wanting to ensure that compulsory 
                                                          
72.  Frankly, supra note 68, at 997. 
 
73.  See generally J. Eugene Salomon, Jr., Note, The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The 
Case for a Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179 (1987). 
 
74.  Id. at 1195. 
 
75.  Id. at 1194 (positing that “[t]he better solution is to grant the individual an exclusive 
right within the limited sphere of commercial use”). 
 
76.  See generally Salomon, Jr., supra note 73 (All provided examples of commercial 
works are classic advertisements). 
 
77.  See, e.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and 
Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 127, 240 (1993). 
 
78.  Id. 
 
79.  Pamela Lynn Kunath, Note & Comment, Lights, Camera, Animate!: The Right of 
Publicity’s Effect on Computer-Animated Celebrities, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 863, 870 (1996). 
 
80.  Id. at 903–04. 
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licenses are not “glutting the market.”
81
  Kunath suggests solving this 
problem by forcing the right holder to agree to a limited number of 
contracts per year, although Kunath does not address what would happen if 
agreements stalled or if there were fewer bidders than the mandated 
minimum.
82
  Kunath also identifies the holdout problem inherent in rights 
of publicity negotiations, stating that “[w]ithout compulsory licensing, 
when celebrities are asked to license their likeness for use in narrative 
works, they will inevitably and understandably attempt to get the most 
money for their image, [but] will lack the foresight to see the ramifications 
such stubbornness will have on the . . . system as a whole.”
83
 
While none of these works go into detail about how a FCLRRP might 
function, their discussion of the potential benefits and pitfalls of such a 
system serve as the foundation for this article’s recommendations.  Until 
Hart and Keller, a FCLRRP remained necessary only in theory.  But now 
the problem is very real, jeopardizing games loved by millions of fans that 
generate billions of dollars in revenue.  The time has come to put theory 
into practice. 
 
III. COMPULSORY LICENSING IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Compulsory licensing systems to facilitate the efficient distribution of 
intellectual property are established in at least four areas
84
 and can provide 
guidance in crafting a FCLRRP.  The current systems are notable in several 
regards.  First, they all cover the licensing of copyrighted material and all 
but one concerns the copyrights of musical works.
85
  Second, they exhibit a 
wide range of fee and distribution structures, suggesting that there is no 
                                                          
81.  Id. at 904. 
 
82.  Id. (“Personalities will not be forced to accept every request, which could result in 
glutting the market with their likeness; however, there will be a statutory minimum requirement 
of acceptances.”). 
 
83.  Id. at 906. 
 
84.  See Rates & Terms for Use of Musical Works Under Compulsory License for Making 
and Distrib. of Physical & Digital Phonorecords, 37 C.F.R. § 385 (2009); 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2014); 
17 U.S.C. § 115 (2010). 
 
85.  37 C.F.R. § 385; 17 U.S.C. § 111; 17 U.S.C. § 115.  
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definitive method for administering such a system.
86
  These structures are 
tailored to the particular intellectual property rights at issue.  Indeed, even 
within a given licensing regime, one sees a hybrid of statutory, regulatory, 
judicial, and free market mechanisms for administering the compulsory 
license.  This section provides an overview of these compulsory licensing 
regimes, while the next section highlights challenges that would be specific 
to a compulsory license governing rights of publicity. 
 
A. Musical Performance Rights 
 
Among the various copyrights embedded in a musical work is a 
song’s performance right, which covers the right to perform a work, 
including broadcast performance.
87
  The right allows the holder to spin 
tracks but does not cover outright sales of the song in tangible mediums, 
such as in a CD.
88
  There is no statute that compels a right holder to license 
the performance right in a musical work, but most rights holders are part of 
a Performing Rights Organization
89
 which is bound by an antitrust consent 
decree to license the catalog of songs it holds to a purchaser at a reasonable 
price.
90
  In practice, entities like radio stations who wish to play a wide 
variety of music can purchase a license from one or all of the three 
Performing Rights Organizations which then allows them to play all the 
musical works in that organization’s catalog.
91
 
                                                          
86.  Compare Mechanical Rights Licensing (setting at a fixed fee), infra Section III.B, 
with Digital Performance Rights Licensing (paying a statutorily mandated 50/50 split of revenues 
to artists and rights holders), infra Section III.C. 
 
87.  17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2002). 
 
88.  Compare id., with 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2002). 
 
89.  While it is difficult to quantify the total pool of all “musicians” let alone “rights 
holders,” there are nearly a million members in ASCAP and BMI, substantially more than the 
number of persons the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates work full time in the “Musical Group 
or Artist” and “Music Directors and Composers” employment categories.  While there are many 
retired and part-time musicians, the fact that PROs have more members than there are full time 
musicians in the U.S. demonstrates the consensus that most musicians generating any sizable 
revenue are members in a PRO.  See Kristin Thomson, How Many Musicians Are There?, ARTIST 
REVENUE STREAMS (June 15, 2012), http://money.futureofmusic.org/how-many-musicians-are-
there/ [http://perma.cc/72AR-T8CA]. 
 
90.  See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers, No. 41-
1395(WCC), 2001 WL 1589999, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001). 
 
91.  Of the roughly 15,000 United States radio stations, more than 10,000 are members of 
the Radio Music Licensing Committee, which negotiates rates for full-catalog licenses with the 
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Performing Rights Organizations arose to meet a logistical need;
92
 
gathering the necessary licenses from all rights-holders is a time consuming 
and inefficient process.  Performance Rights Organizations gather these 
catalogs of music for licensors, allowing radio stations, cover bands, bars, 
and nightclubs to interact with only a handful of organizations to obtain the 
rights to play a wide range of songs.
93
  In turn, artists are motivated to join 
Performing Rights Organizations as many licensors will only play and pay 
for music that is available through a catalog license—and if his or her 
music were played by a broadcaster, the artist would often lack the means 
to police and enforce his or her rights.
94
  If an artist holds out, a licensee 
will simply play other songs for which they can easily obtain the 
performance rights.
95
  But while Performing Rights Organizations solve the 
inefficiency that is inherent in the market for musical performance rights, 
they create the danger of another: that they might exercise monopoly power 
in distributing the rights.
96
  For this reason, Performing Rights 
Organizations like ASCAP are subject to consent decrees that limit the 
scope of their operations.
97
 
First, while Performing Rights Organizations do not have statutorily 
fixed rates and instead, rates are regularly negotiated, they are obligated to 
offer their whole catalog to any purchaser for a price that is the same as 
                                                          
Performing Rights Organizations.  See Our Mission, RADIO MUSIC LICENSE COMMITTEE (2010), 
http://www.radiomlc.org/ [http://perma.cc/FA4D-RCN4]; Jennifer Waits, Number of Radio 
Stations in the U.S. Grows this Quarter According to FCC, RADIO SURVIVOR (Oct. 14, 2015), 
http://www.radiosurvivor.com/2015/10/14/number-of-radio-stations-in-the-u-s-grows-this-
quarter-according-to-fcc/ [http://perma.cc/4ZT2-4CXA]. 
 
92.  See Bernard Korman & I. Fred Koenigsberg, Performing Rights in Music and 
Performing Rights Societies, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 332, 367 (1986). 
 
93.  See id. 
 
94.  Id. at 360−64. 
 
95.  In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that 
“because of the nature of its music service, [the online radio station] ha[s] more of an ability to 
substitute one work for another than many other music services” and that unlike an on-demand 
service, a radio station does not need “to play virtually any composition its listeners demand”). 
 
96.  See Richard Ergo, ASCAP and the Antitrust Laws: The Story of a Reasonable 
Compromise, 258 DUKE L.J. 258, 260 (1959). 
 
97.  See generally United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers, No. 
41-1395(WCC), 2001 WL 1589999.  See also United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 426 F.3d 91, 
93 (2d Cir. 2005).  
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they charge other similarly situated licensors.
98
  For this reason, the 
licenses are considered compulsory.  Second, a Performing Rights 
Organization cannot hold exclusive control over the songs in its catalog.
99
  
The rights holder must remain free to license the performing rights to its 
musical works on an individual basis.
100
  This limits the opportunities for 
Performing Rights Organizations to exploit licensors, as a licensor finding 
the price too high or only seeking the rights to a few songs can always set 
about the task of gathering the needed licenses one by one from the rights 
holders.  Third, the Federal Register publishes price schedules so interested 
parties can ensure they are getting similar rates as other purchasers and 
purchasers who believe they are not receiving a rate that comparable 
entities are receiving can litigate the matter in court.
101
  For licensees who 
operate interactive streaming services, like Spotify, the rate for the 
combined performance and mechanical license is set by statute.
102
  Subject 
to these restrictions, Performing Rights Organizations remain free to 
otherwise set rates as they see fit.
103
  This means rates can be—and are—
set based on a wide range of factors, including venue type, size of the 
audience, and number of track “spins.”
104
 
Performing Rights Organizations also remain largely free to 
determine the most effective way to monitor the use of particular 
performance rights, enforce those rights against unauthorized users, and set 
distribution schedules for transferring royalties to its member rights 
holders.
105
  These distribution schedules can be complex.
106
  For example, 
                                                          
98.  Am. Soc’y of Composers, 2001 WL 1589999, at *3.  
 
99.  Id. at *4.  
 
100.  Id. at *3. 
 
101.  See, e.g., Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for Noncommercial 
Broadcasting, 77 Fed. Reg. 24662, 24665 (proposed Apr. 25, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. 
381).  
 
102.  See Rates & Terms for Use of Musical Works Under Compulsory License for 
Making and Distrib. of Physical & Digital Phonorecords, 37 C.F.R. § 385.12 (2009). 
 
103.  See generally Am. Soc’y of Composers, 2001 WL 1589999; 37 C.F.R. § 385.  
 
104.  See ASCAP Music License Agreements & Reporting Forms, ASCAP (2015), 
http://www.ascap.com/licensing/licensefinder [http://perma.cc/QGH2-PGTG]. 
 
105.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002); see also Am. Soc’y of Composers, 2001 WL 1589999, at 
*9–10. 
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ASCAP determines the royalties paid to members based on factors 
including the music’s role in the performance (background, promotional, 
theme, etc.), the type of licensees using the music (radio, television, night 
clubs), the time of day the music was performed, and whether the music 
was performed enough times to be considered “premium.”
107
  Once 
calculated, royalties exceeding $1 are direct-deposited into members’ 
accounts every quarter or for members opting to receive a live check, all 
royalties reaching at least a $100 threshold are mailed to the member.
108
 
 
 
 
B. Mechanical rights to a song or composition 
 
Another compulsory licensing regime in the United States exists for 
the mechanical rights to a song.
109
  In order to legally affix a song into a 
recording, either analog or digital, an artist needs to secure the mechanical 
rights to the music.
110
  When recording an original work that has not been 
sold by the creator to a third-party, an artist will already possess the 
mechanical rights to the music by virtue of owning the copyright to the 
song.
111
  When a person wishes to sell or distribute copies of a work for 
which he or she does not have the mechanical right, such as when a song 
was written by a separate song writer or the artist is covering another’s 
song and recording it, mechanical rights need to be obtained.
112
  Similar to 
                                                          
106.  The current operative antitrust consent decrees for both ASCAP and BMI place 
some broad restrictions on how rights are enforced and royalties are distributed.  For example, 
money is to be distributed “primarily on the basis of performances of its members’ works,” 
although special awards can be granted to works that “have a unique prestige value.”  See Am. 
Soc’y of Composers, 2001 WL 1589999, at *9.  
 
107.  See ASCAP Payment System: Royalty Calculation, ASCAP (2015), 
http://www.ascap.com/members/payment/royalties.aspx [http://perma.cc/XRA7-UKUR]. 
 
108.  See Direct Deposit and Royalty Thresholds, ASCAP (2015), 
http://ascap.com/members/payment/payment.aspx [http://perma.cc/4SDW-53QK]. 
 
109.  17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2002). 
 
110.  Id. § 115 (2010); see also ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON 
ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 8:6 (3d ed. 2015). 
 
111.  17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3). 
 
112.  17 U.S.C. § 501 (2002), invalidated by Nat’l Ass’n of Boards of Pharmacy v. Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2011); see also 17 U.S.C. § 115. 
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the regime for performance rights, the mechanical right to a musical work 
can be obtained by individual negotiation with the rights holder, but there is 
also a rate set by the Copyright Royalty Board that a rights holder is 
statutorily required to accept.
113
  This rate is currently 9.10 cents per song 
sold for songs under five minutes and twelve seconds, and an additional 
1.75 cents a minute for longer works.
114
 
Unlike performance rights, mechanical rates are universally 
applicable to all entities seeking a license under the compulsory scheme.
115
  
This means that unlike performance rights, the rates for mechanical rights 
generate little if any litigation surrounding the reasonableness of charged 
pricing.
116
  It also means that there is no flexibility with pricing based on 
the type of use or the user’s business model.
117
  This tradeoff reflects the far 
less diverse usage of mechanical licenses relative to performance 
licenses.
118
  Mechanical rights are necessary to sell tracks of songs that 
listeners can play on-demand.
119
  Whether the form is a digital or analog 
copy, the basic use is the same: a user is selling a track.
120
  While the 
business models for the companies that distribute music tracks are 
                                                          
 
113.  See 17 U.S.C. § 115; see also Michael Simon, The Basics of Mechanical Licensing 
from Harry Fox, ARTIST HOUSE MUSIC (July 12, 2007), 
http://www.artistshousemusic.org/articles/the+basics+of+mechanical+licensing+from+harry+fox 
[http://perma.cc/77PN-E5TZ].   
 
114.  See Rates & Terms for Use of Musical Works Under Compulsory License for 
Making and Distrib. of Physical & Digital Phonorecords, 37 C.F.R. § 385.3 (2009); see also Dale 
Kawashima, An Overview of Mechanical Royalty Rates, SONGWRITER UNIVERSE, 
http://www.songwriteruniverse.com/mechanical.html [http://perma.cc/67JM-Y8LC]. 
 
115.  See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1). 
 
116.  See generally Meredith Corp. v. SESAC, LLC, No. 09 Civ. 9177, 2011 WL 856266 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2011); In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317 (offering examples of 
notable royalty rights litigation focused on performance rights rather than mechanical rights).  
 
117.  See generally 17 U.S.C. § 115. 
 
118.  See generally What is a Mechanical License?, HARRY FOX AGENCY (2015), 
http://www.harryfox.com/license_music/what_is_mechanical_license.html [http://perma.cc/436S-
94QW]. 
 
119.  See id. (“A mechanical license grants the rights to reproduce and distribute 
copyrighted musical compositions (songs) on CDs, records, tapes, ringtones, permanent digital 
downloads, interactive streams and other digital configurations supporting various business 
models, including locker-based music services and bundled music offerings.”). 
 
120.  See id.  
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undoubtedly variable, the basic function varies far less than in the case of 
performance rights, which run the gamut from garage bands to national 
radio broadcasters.
121
  There is also a greater similarity in the range of 
profit per use in the case of mechanical rights.  A track sold is a track sold 
and any one sale is unlikely to be massive in absolute monetary terms 
regardless of whether the distributor is a small start-up or a massive record 
label.
122
  In contrast, a single use of a performance license could be a song 
played to a bar with one customer or a national broadcast reaching millions 
of people.
123
  The presence of a limited range of profitability per use in the 
mechanical rights sphere makes a nonvariable rate a more sensible option 
for a compulsory scheme, as compared to one for performance rights. 
 
 
C. Digital Performance Rights for Sound Recordings 
 
Since 1995, sound recording copyright owners (“SRCOs”) have held 
a digital performance right in the broadcasting or other performance of that 
sound recording apart from or in addition to the performance rights in the 
same work.
124
  Conceptually, this can be thought of as a more precise form 
of the performance right.  Whereas the performance right covers any 
performance or broadcast of a song, the sound recording copyright covers 
the performance of a specific digital recording of a song.
125
  Like the 
system for generally applicable performance rights, compulsory licensing 
for sound recording performance rights is overseen by the copyright royalty 
board, but on a day-to-day basis is negotiated through a separate 
independent entity.
126
  Currently, there is a single organization that licenses 
                                                          
121.  See id.  
 
122.  See, e.g., iTunes, APPLE INC. (2016), http://www.apple.com/itunes/music/ 
[http://perma.cc/NZF7-29XD] (featuring songs for as little as $0.00 to as much as $9.99). 
 
123.  See, e.g., Phil Gallo, MTV VMA Ratings: Biggest Audience Ever, BILLBOARD (Aug. 
29, 2011), http://www.billboard.com/articles/photos/live/467676/mtv-vma-ratings-biggest-
audience-ever [http://perma.cc/Z84V-KJSK]. 
 
124.  See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2010). 
 
125.  17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2002). 
 
126.  See Commercial Webcaster (CRB), SOUNDEXCHANGE (2014), 
http://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/commercial-webcaster/commercial-webcaster-
crb/ [http://perma.cc/KNS8-MXRW]. 
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sound recording rights, collects the royalties for them, and distributes them 
to the rights holders and artists. 
127
  This organization is SoundExchange. 
SoundExchange’s current price structure is complicated, with 
different policies based on broadcaster size and type.
128
  Licenses are a 
combination of lump sum minimum fees, per-play fixed rates, and 
percentage of gross revenue rates, making calculations of comparable 
effective rates difficult.
129
  However, in 2015, Pureplay Webcasters were 
charged a minimum of 25% of gross revenue
130
 and Small Webcasters were 
charged a minimum of 10%.
131
  Because larger broadcasters are charged a 
fixed per-play rate, a precise figure cannot be calculated for them.
132
  
However, a recent court decision noted that Pandora pays over 50% of its 
gross revenue to SoundExchange.
133
 
Although SoundExchange has the authority to enter into individual 
negotiations over rates and generally has the discretion to attempt to set 
reasonable rates on its own, it lacks the power to determine how the 
collected revenue is distributed.
134
  Under 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2), 
SoundExchange is required to distribute its revenue according to a 
                                                          
127.  Eduardo Loret de Mola, SoundExchange Explained, MUSIC BUSINESS JOURNAL 
(Oct. 2015), http://www.thembj.org/2015/10/soundexchange-explained/ [http://perma.cc/PS2D-
7AWA] (“Currently, this organization is the sole entity entrusted by the Copyright Royalty Board 
(which is appointed by the U.S. Library of Congress) with administering statutory license fees 
paid by non-interactive digital radio services.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
128.  See 2016 Rates, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/service-
provider/rates/ [http://perma.cc/3S9P-Z6DU]. 
 
129.  See id. 
 
130.  See Pureplay Webcaster, SOUNDEXCHANGE, 
http://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/commercial-webcaster/pureplay-webcaster/ 
[http://perma.cc/TY49-KSM7]. 
 
131.  See Small Webcaster, SOUNDEXCHANGE (2014), 
http://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/commercial-webcaster/small-
webcaster/ [http://perma.cc/Z5T7-Z2BU]. 
 
132.  See Commercial Webcaster 2016 Rates, SOUNDEXCHANGE, 
http://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/rates/commercial-webcaster 
[http://perma.cc/EEN6-TA8E]. 
 
133.  See In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Pandora 
pays over half of its revenue to record companies for their sound recording rights.”). 
 
134.  17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2) (2010). 
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statutorily mandated formula.
135
  Specifically, after deducting 
administrative expenses associated with monitoring, collecting, and 
distributing sound recording royalties, 50% must be distributed to the rights 
holder, 45% to the featured artists, and the remaining 5% placed in escrow 
for distribution to nonfeatured artists and vocalists.
136
  There is no apparent 
economic necessity for the mandated distribution structure, which is not 
found in the licensing regimes enacted for performance and mechanical 
rights.  Likely, the mandate reflects Congress’s attempt to cater to the 
popular belief that record labels extort artists,
137
 with the mandate thereby 
ensuring that half of the revenue goes to the artists rather than the record 
labels who generally hold the copyright in the sound recordings. 
 
D. Cable Television Retransmission 
 
In 1972, the United States established a compulsory licensing system 
for the retransmission of television signals.
138
  At the time, there was a 
growing trend of cable television providers retransmitting the signals of 
broadcast television, often from stations that were outside the immediate 
geographic location of the viewership.
139
  Initially, this move was not 
viewed as harming copyright holders, as the retransmission expanded the 
audience of the channel, which then allowed television providers to charge 
higher rates for advertising.
140
  However, when the signals were viewed at 
distant locations, local advertisers were unwilling to pay extra for these 
views as they were outside the target market and moreover, cable television 
increasingly generated revenue through subscription fees which were in 
part driven by the availability of content provided by local broadcasters.
141
  
                                                          
135.  Id. § 114(g)(2). 
 
136.  Id. § 114(g)(2)–(3). 
 
137.  See Michael Arrington, The Music Industry’s New Extortion 
Scheme, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 27, 2008), http://techcrunch.com/2008/03/27/the-music-industrys-
new-extortion-scheme/ [http://perma.cc/L7N6-WN4D]. 
 
138.  Fred H. Cate, Cable Television and the Compulsory Copyright License, 42 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 191, 199 (1990). 
 
139.  Id. 
 
140.  Id. 
 
141.  Id. 
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While it would have been possible for the cable providers to individually 
negotiate licenses for this content, Congress felt “it would be impractical 
and unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with 
every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a cable 
system.”
142
  For this reason, along with a fear that “big television networks” 
would holdout or set an unfair price (along with the influence of related 
lobbying from the cable industry), a compulsory system was established in 
lieu of a purely free market approach to licensing.
143
 
The rate charged for licensing the right to retransmit television 
programming is set by statute and is subject to modification by the 
Copyright Royalty Judges to account for inflation and changes in fees paid 
for cable subscriptions.
144
  Fees paid by retransmitters vary based on 
location of the originating station, whether it is network television or not, 
and the overall revenue of the retransmitter.
145
  The fees charged on 
network television are lower than those charged on local broadcast stations, 
based on reasoning that network television, which attracts national 
advertisers, is more likely to gain revenue as a result of the retransmission 
than their local broadcast counterparts.
146
  Retransmitters also pay declining 
rates as more content is retransmitted, thereby reflecting the declining 
marginal value of additional content to the cable viewer.
147
  At this stage in 
the licensing royalty process, rates do not reflect any indicator of actual 
value added or viewership.
148
 
The formula for imposing fees on retransmitters is complicated but 
fixed as a portion of revenue.
149
  A cable service provider knows in 
advance what portion of gross revenue it will have to pay based on what 
                                                          
142.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976). 
 
143.  Cate, supra note 138, at 203.  
 
144.  See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(1)(A) (2014); see also id. § 801(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
 
145.  See id. § 111(d)(1)(A); see also WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 14:75 
(2016). 
 
146.  Cate, supra note 138, at 207. 
 
147.  Id. at 208. 
 
148.  Id. 
 
149.  Id. 
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stations, if any, it chooses to retransmit using the compulsory license.
150
  In 
contrast, the mechanism for distributing the collected royalties is not only 
more complicated but also subject to a more nuanced (and subjective) 
valuation of the content that is provided by the original content providers.  
Under the compulsory licensing scheme for cable television retransmission, 
royalties are distributed as follows: 
 
After deducting its reasonable costs incurred as a result of 
administering the Statements of Account, the Copyright Office 
deposits the balance in the United States Treasury, where it is 
invested in interest-bearing U.S. securities for later distribution 
by the Librarian of Congress. 
The fees are distributed among the following copyright 
owners: (1) those whose works were included in a nonnetwork 
television program imported as a distant signal; (2) those 
whose works were included in a secondary transmission 
identified in a special statement of account filed pursuant to 
Section 111(d)(1)(A); and (3) those whose works were 
included in nonnetwork radio broadcasts and imported as 
distant signals.
  
Distribution is conducted in two phases. . . . 
The first stage of the proceeding, called “Phase I,” is 
conducted to determine the percentage of the funds to be 
allocated among the various categories of copyrighted 
programs retransmitted by cable operators [while] Phase II 
determines the allocation of royalties among the individual 
claimants within any given category.
151
 
 
While rights holders are allowed and encouraged to reach an 
agreement as to how the fees should be distributed in lieu of litigation, the 
Copyright Royalty Board resolves the controversies that inevitably arise.
152
  
While the Copyright Royalty Board is prone to find that genuine 
controversies over royalty distribution exist, in practice, by Phase II, all 
distribution is settled by private negotiation.
153
  In settling these disputes, 
                                                          
150.  Id. 
 
151.  PATRY, supra note 145, at §§ 14:76–78. 
 
152.  Cate, supra note 138, at 209. 
 
153.  Id. at 210. 
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the Copyright Royalty Board looks at a number of primary and secondary 
criteria: 
 
 (1) [H]arm caused to copyright owners by cable transmissions 
of copyrighted works; (2) benefit derived from the secondary 
transmission of copyrighted works; and (3) marketplace value 
of the copyrighted works that are transmitted.  The secondary 
criteria are: (1) the quality of the copyrighted works; and (2) 
time-related considerations.  According to the C[opyright 
Royalty Board], the Tribunal’s underlying goal is “to simulate 
market evaluation.”
154
 
 
Resolving these issues often takes years and the result for the litigants 
can be underwhelming.  Cate notes that in the 1982 distribution, one 
company sought to increase its $28.42 million payment; while ultimately 
victorious, the increase amounted to only $70,000.
155
  Whatever the total 
cost on courts and rights holders, the distribution of royalties for cable 
television retransmission presents a less efficient system than those found 
in the music industry, where royalties can be distributed according to an 
established and existing structure.  But this complication reflects the simple 
reality that computing the value of a television channel is a substantially 
more complicated process than computing the value of a song, and changes 
in the value of a broadcast channel retransmission are not neatly captured 
by changes in overall retransmission rates in the same way a change in the 
value of a musical work is seen in a reduced number of “spins” or 
reproductions.  The fluid structure of cable retransmission’s compulsory 
licensing regime is born of necessity, not convenience. 
Yet despite criticism of the cable television’s compulsory license, the 
inefficiency generated by the system does not appear to be one of them.  In 
his critique of the system, Cate notes the system is characterized by a 
“fairly low administrative cost” relative to the size of the total fund.
156
  In a 
United States Copyright Office report from 2008 which recommended 
phasing out the outdated system, the authors noted that the regime “has 
proven to be an efficient mechanism to clear copyrighted works[, but] at 
                                                          
154.  Id. 
 
155.  Id. 
 
156.  Cate, supra note 138, at 221. 
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below-market rates.”
157
  The compulsory licensing regime for cable 
television retransmission rights shows that even a flexible system can 
generate gains in licensing efficiency, even if it does not also generate 
gains in efficacy. 
 
IV. CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING A LICENSING REGIME FOR RIGHTS OF 
PUBLICITY 
 
As noted above, no scholar to date has laid out a complete or 
comprehensive structure for a federal compulsory licensing regime for 
rights of publicity FCLRRP and this is not without good reason.
158
  
Creating a regime for rights of publicity implicates challenges unlike those 
faced by existing statutory regimes.  The business environment for 
interactive entertainment, combined with the underlying nature of the right 
of publicity, means that in implementing a FCLRRP, little can be copied 
wholesale from existing regimes.  Beyond the administrative burdens of 
establishing a new compulsory system, challenges exist that, without 
careful or creative design, threaten the viability of the entire regime.  If 
there is to be a genuine push for legislation establishing a FCLRRP that 
addresses these challenges, they first need to be acknowledged.  This 
section highlights these novel challenges, explaining how they arise in the 
context of a FCLRRP and why they are nonexistent or trivial in the 
implementation of existing compulsory licensing regimes. 
An effective FCLRRP will need to be designed to consider the 
following: (1) rights of publicity generate greater holdout concerns than the 
rights subject to existing compulsory regimes; (2) the value of a person’s 
likeness is difficult to quantify; (3) use of regulated private entities such as 
ASCAP is not feasible for rights of publicity; (4) the ability of rights 
holders to enter into exclusive agreements has demonstrated value in the 
interactive entertainment industry so any loss of this ability under a 
FCLRRP may have negative impacts; and (5) the functional and profitable 
aggregation and assignment of rights of publicity in the context of 
professional sports means that any FCLRRP will need to be drafted to 
leave these systems intact if the regime is to maintain its efficacy and 
political viability.  This article addresses each of these challenges. 
 
                                                          
157.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION & 
REAUTHORIZATION ACT § 109 REPORT, Exec. Summary, at vii (2008). 
 
158.  See supra, Section II.D. 
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A. The Existence and Ethics of Holding Out 
 
To date, compulsory licensing regimes have addressed markets where 
bargaining for, monitoring, and enforcing intellectual property rights would 
be unduly burdensome.  Whether it involves music licensing or television 
transmission, it is the often-stated view that there are too many 
stakeholders and too much content to allow prices to be set by the free 
market through unwieldy individual bargaining.
159
  This feature exists for 
attempts to license large quantities of rights of publicity as well.
160
  A video 
game can include hundreds or even thousands of likenesses
161
 and the 
process of approaching and negotiating with each individual rights holder 
would be costly—likely prohibitively so.  For this reason alone, a 
compulsory regime for rights of publicity is sensible. 
Rights of publicity pose a problem even greater than the inefficiencies 
found in many intellectual property markets.  For those seeking to create a 
historically accurate simulation of the real world, a license for the entire set 
of rights of publicity necessary for the game is not just desirable, it is 
necessary.  A game that is 90% accurate is substantially less valuable than 
one that is 100% accurate.  Unlike a DJ who can play other musicians who 
are popular at the moment or play other music in the same genre if he or 
she lacks access to some music, the creator of a historical simulation has no 
substitute for the real thing.  Spotify survived for years without the 
Beatles,
162
 but an NCAA football game cannot survive without Derrick 
                                                          
159.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89; United States Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division, Comments of Netflix, Inc. 1, 10 (Aug. 6, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/08/20/307908.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Z9QW-BWX4] (“Th[e] hypothetical competitive market for broadcast music 
performance rights would involve transaction costs.  That is, programming producers and 
copyright owners would potentially have to expend time and/or money negotiating and then 
paying the fees.  These costs would likely be passed on to the downstream broadcasters, so that 
the cost of programming would be increased to reflect both the value of the performance rights 
conveyed by the copyright holders and the costs of acquiring those rights.”). 
 
160.  See generally id. 
 
161.  See generally Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement with 
Defendant Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013) (accepting allegation that the class 
contained “over 100,000 individuals” in granting preliminary approval of the class action 
settlement). 
 
162.  See Max Willens, The Beatles are Streaming Everywhere, but Spotify has the Most 
to Gain, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2015, 1:30 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/beatles-are-
streaming-everywhere-spotify-has-most-gain-2238361 [http://perma.cc/K89N-G76S]. 
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Henry.  As addressed in the above discussion of Hart and Keller, the 
possibility of holdout eviscerates the ability for developers and other 
creative artists to create historically accurate simulations in a way that is 
simply not present in the music or cable television industry.
163
  Without a 
compulsory regime, the last few rights holders can holdout in an effort to 
exploit the creative artists out of additional compensation.  This possibility, 
when considered prior to work beginning on an interactive medium, will 
likely deter developers from even attempting the process.  For this reason, 
the need for a compulsory license is far greater in the context of rights of 
publicity than for other intellectual property rights. 
This is unfortunate because from an ethical perspective, there is far 
less reason to think such an outcome is tolerable than in the context of the 
intellectual property rights governing creative works.  When an artist writes 
a song or a director films a movie, he or she is creating something new that 
would not exist absent his or her active work and effort.  If a rights holder 
then chooses to keep that work private, there may be a loss of value, but 
that loss is no greater than if the artist had not set about the task of creating 
the work in the first place.  There is no fear that the exercise of copyright to 
withhold works from the general populace will ever leave us as a society 
worse off than if the right had not been established since the creator always 
has the option of simply not engaging in the creative enterprise in the first 
place.  J. D. Salinger’s decision to keep his writings private is 
disappointing, but it does not infringe on the ability of others to realize 
their creative potential, engage in political discourse, or otherwise pursue 
their lives as they choose. 
Those who exercise their rights of publicity in a manner that prevents 
others from creating historically accurate simulations are not withholding 
something they have created: they are preventing others from creating.  As 
the majority in Hart acknowledges, the right to speak truths about 
whomever and whatever a citizen desires is at the heart of the First 
Amendment and our democracy.
164
  As described above, at its very 
inception, the right of publicity distinguished itself from privacy rights in 
that it was not meant to protect a person’s right to be left alone, it was 
meant to protect a person’s right to receive compensation for his or her 
                                                          
163.  See supra Section II.B. 
164.  “Freedom of expression is not only essential to check tyranny and foster self-
government but also intrinsic to individual liberty and dignity and instrumental in society’s search 
for truth.”  Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 787 (1985)). 
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fame and notoriety.
165
  There is no reason to believe that a system that 
allows rights of publicity to be used as a shield, not from defamation or 
degradation but from the discussion in its entirety, should be maintained.  
While a person’s right to reject a bargain normally ensures a fair price is 
reached in the free market, there is little reason to maintain it in the context 
of rights of publicity where the right of refusal is used not to arrive at a fair 
price, but to extort an unfair one. 
A FCLRRP needs to be drafted with this in mind.  Functionally and 
morally, any FCLRRP that, like the regimes for music, allows rights 
holders to opt out of the system entirely cannot be sustained.  In designing 
a FCLRRP, drafters need to ensure that any mechanisms aimed at 
preserving or mimicking free market bargaining do not allow opportunities 
for exploitive holdout to linger.  A failure to do so means the FCLRRP will 
fail to achieve its fundamental purpose. 
 
B. Difficulty in Quantifying the Value of a Given Depiction or Likeness 
 
To compensate someone fairly for the use of his or her property, 
whether it is real or a legally established intellectual property right like the 
right of publicity, the value of that right must be determined.  In free 
market exchanges, this is simple: the value of a good is what someone is 
willing to pay for it.  In a compulsory regime, however, the license is 
mandatory, so one cannot simply look at the exchange price to determine 
the property’s value, if there is even an existing exchange price to begin 
with.  This determination is all the more difficult where the acquired rights 
are bundled intellectual property rather than a single right or work.  While 
Performing Rights Organizations like ASCAP rely primarily on free market 
negotiations to settle on a fair price for their catalog of works,
166
 there is no 
equivalent mechanic for determining how that revenue should be 
distributed among component rights holders.  Instead, the organization 
must look elsewhere to generate a fair distribution. 
In music, there is a readily available metric to apportion value—track 
listens.
167
  While the digital age gives us access to a wealth of music in a 
                                                          
165.  See supra Section II.A. 
 
166.  United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers, No. 41-
1395(WCC), 2001 WL 1589999, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001). 
 
167.  U.S. Radio Royalties, BMI (2016), 
http://www.bmi.com/creators/royalty/us_radio_royalties [http://perma.cc/8MA7-Q2TV]. 
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variety of genres, the function of listening to a track remains largely the 
same whether one is listening to Prince or Phillip Glass.  Regardless of 
venue, music genre, or audience size, when people listen to music, they are 
pretty much engaging in the exact same act.  This makes track listens a 
comparable metric across all musicians, which in turn makes it an effective 
way of assigning value to the rights within a Performing Rights 
Organization’s catalog.  This is all the more true because, with rare 
exceptions, people tend to listen to one track at a time, which ultimately 
provides discrete units of measurement.
168
  There is also a strong indication 
that a played track provides the highest value of any track in the 
Performing Rights Organization’s catalog at the time it is played—
otherwise the user would simply have selected a more desirable song—
which means track listens are a great indicator of actual value to the 
consumer.
169
  While a given customer may get more absolute value out of a 
given song than another user, we know that each is getting the most value 
at that moment in time relative to their other options.  For this reason, a 
distribution system based primarily on track listens is a sensible and 
efficient way to distribute royalties in the music industry and indeed, we 
see Performing Rights Organizations using precisely such a system.
170
 
In video games, however, there is no such comparable metric.  Unlike 
in music, the process of playing one game is often radically different from 
the next.  Rather than presenting a continuous flow of information to a 
single sense, as listening to a song does, a video game engages many senses 
at a rate that is influenced, if not entirely controlled by, the user.  What the 
player sees and focuses on varies from user to user, and from play session 
to play session.  While data could be collected to document the amount of 
time a given likeness appears on a player’s screen,
171
 such information 
cannot be reflexively converted to a monetary value as in music.  A given 
screen may contain dozens or even hundreds of likenesses at a given time, 
which will provide varying degrees of value to the player experience.  For 
example, a user playing a basketball game may mostly derive value out of 
                                                          
168.  See Billboard 200 Makeover: Album Chart to Incorporate Streams and Track 
Sales, BILLBOARD (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/chart-
beat/6320099/billboard-200-makeover-streams-digital-tracks [http://perma.cc/UJR6-Y5VU]. 
 
169.  Id. 
 
170.  See, e.g., U.S. Radio Royalties, supra note 167. 
 
171.  See Extra Credits, Extra Credits: Metrics, YOUTUBE (May 10, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nqGcXOksFGg [http://perma.cc/FTQ4-C5NA]. 
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being able to play as his favorite basketball player, even when he is 
controlling that player’s other team members periodically throughout the 
game.  That consumer may find the game more authentic, and thus more 
valuable, if the players on the sidelines are the team’s real life second 
string, but the second string’s presence on the screen is unlikely to be as 
valuable as the avatars controlled by the player, even if they occupy 
comparable screen time.  Thus, for the use of publicity rights in video 
games, there is simply no common currency like in music. 
This means that any FCLRRP will need to adopt a more nuanced 
approach to determining value if it is going to do so fairly.  As we see in 
the system governing television retransmission rights,
172
 it is possible to 
have a more nuanced, flexible approach to such determinations.  However, 
doing so adds cost, uncertainty, and arbitrary allocations.  A well-designed 
FCLRRP will need to create a system that efficiently determines the 
relative value of licensed likenesses while also minimizing these pitfalls. 
 
C. Inability to Establish Regulated Private Rights Aggregators 
 
At first glance, it would appear the use of regulated private entities 
like ASCAP to gather, negotiate, and license rights of publicity would be a 
way to maintain free market mechanics in a FCLRRP and to duplicate 
existing and successful systems.  Certainly, the use of such entities in the 
music industry has been successful.
173
  Moreover, professional sports 
organizations already serve this function for the rights of publicity of their 
players,
174
 so it would seem the market is already implementing these 
mechanisms successfully.  Unfortunately, a FCLRRP would face difficulty 
in relying on a system of regulated aggregators as the primary or sole 
method of pricing and distributing rights.  The number of rights of publicity 
is simply too massive and the variety and value of those rights too 
divergent, for such a system to be functional in a FCLRRP.  While many 
different professionals contribute to different aspects of the musical 
                                                          
172.  See supra Section III.D.  
 
173.  See About ASCAP, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/about [http://perma.cc/FL35-
NHWW]. 
 
174.  See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, EXHIBIT 10.3: NFL PLAYER CONTRACT FOR 
ARIAN FOSTER § 4 (Mar. 6, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1573683/000104746913009713/a2216998zex-10_3.htm 
[http://perma.cc/G4R8-4M75]. 
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creation process and may end up holding different types of rights to the 
music, as a group they are relatively small and share similar interests.
175
  In 
contrast, a federal right of publicity statute would cover every United States 
citizen—that is, nearly a thousand times the number of people whom 
musical rights organizations like SoundExchange represent.
176
  If a single 
organization established a license to all existing rights, it would have to 
represent every United States citizen in at least twenty-nine different states.  
A citizen’s right of publicity has a radically different value, in different 
contexts, and many have no value at all.
177
  The administrative hassle of 
creating a new organization that purports to represent them all would be 
foolhardy in light of the sheer number of rights held and the fact that most 
members would never have their likeness licensed or used. 
The ability of organizations like ASCAP to function is further 
supported by the fact that there is a natural incentive for music rights 
holders to be members of those organizations.  Without the monitoring 
ability of a large organization, an individual rights holder would have 
immense difficulty in tracking and policing the use of its music.
178
  And its 
music might not be played at all, as a DJ could simply select a song in the 
licensed catalog rather than play the music of a musician who chose not to 
join.
179
  In this way, Performing Rights Organizations can be voluntary, 
allowing musicians who want to exploit their rights through the free market 
to do so, but also sustainable since, as a practical matter, membership in a 
Performing Rights Organization is likely the financially best option for 
most rights holders. 
But licensing rights of publicity are more complicated.  As addressed 
above, a handful of rogue rights holders can destroy the commercial 
                                                          
175.  SoundExchange represents a little over 100,000 rights holders.  See Working with 
SoundExchange, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/SX-Infographic_as-of-2.13.151.jpg [http://perma.cc/7UMR-V39Z]. 
 
176.  Id. 
 
177.  See Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 
U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 226–30 (2005) (discussing the difficulty of valuing an individual’s name or 
likeness in comparison to valuing a celebrity’s name or likeness). 
 
178.  See Bernard Korman & I. Fred Koenigsberg, Performing Rights in Music and 
Performing Rights Societies, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 332, 367 (1986). 
 
179.  In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Because of the 
nature of its music service, [an online radio station] ha[s] an ability to substitute one work for 
another than many other music services.”). 
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viability of a video game—and the value of any catalog license possessed 
by the aggregator—in a way that the withdrawal of a rogue musician from 
a Performing Rights Organization simply cannot.  Whereas a musical 
performing rights holder has an individual interest in joining a Performing 
Rights Organization, an individual right of publicity holder has an interest 
in abstaining from membership and holding out.  As noted above, 
eliminating the holdout problem is necessarily one of the core functions of 
a FCLRRP.  For this reason, unlike in the case of music, any ASCAP 
equivalent would have to have mandatory membership, which in turn 
introduces the administrative difficulties inherent in such a gigantic 
organization. 
This does not mean that private aggregators cannot have a place in a 
well-designed FCLRRP.  Where an organization can gather the complete 
set of rights needed to create a historically accurate simulation or other 
nontransformative creative work, there is no reason to prevent that from 
occurring.  Currently, organizations like the NFL already assemble the 
publicity rights of their players and negotiate with developers to reach a 
fair market rate.
180
  But these organizations cannot be relied on as the 
principal method for operating the FCLRRP.  If a regime is to be effective 
in solving the holdout problem, then a FCLRRP must have some 
mechanism of compelling every rights holder to license their rights, not just 
those who choose to cede their rights of publicity to an aggregator. 
 
 
D. Benefits of Exclusive Licensing in the Interactive Entertainment Industry 
 
Among the benefits preserved by the ability of a rights holder to 
abstain from licensing found in the free market and in compulsory systems, 
like that for performance rights, is the possibility that a rights holder may 
grant a licensee exclusive rights to the property in question.  This 
exclusivity provides additional value to the licensee, as it can be the only 
product in the market offering a product with likeness features or with that 
likeness endorsing the product in question.  When compared with a system 
                                                          
180.  See Brian Mazique, Building the Perfect Football Game to Coexist with ‘Madden’, 
FORBES (Mar. 4, 2016, 9:53 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/brianmazique/2016/03/04/building-the-perfect-football-game-to-
coexist-with-madden/#2140da837d30 [http://perma.cc/2E5M-2AD2] (discussing the NFL’s 
exclusive license with Electronic Arts for the “Madden” series, as well as the pros and cons of 
that licensing relationship). 
 
ELR – Bucher (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2017  5:09 PM 
88 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1 
 
where anyone is statutorily permitted to license a work, exclusivity 
provides consumers a benefit as well.  If there is only one such product in 
the marketplace, the consumer avoids confusion over which it is they want 
or which is endorsed by the rights holder.  An unchecked, unlimited 
compulsory licensing regime for all rights of publicity could lead to a 
market where consumers could not distinguish which games or other works 
are worthwhile, which could ultimately jeopardize the entire industry.  
Under a simple or underdeveloped compulsory regime, we can imagine a 
world where every year there are fifty NFL simulation games, leading 
consumers to buy inferior products not endorsed or sanctioned by the NFL. 
This concern is particularly prevalent in the video game industry, 
which experienced a massive crash in 1983 as a result of out of control 
branding and a lack of product control.  The leading game system at the 
time, Atari 2600, did not have a mechanism for excluding unauthorized 
games from use.
181
  The business model at the time was not substantially 
hurt by third-party developers creating content for the platform, just as the 
television industry is not hurt by the generation of TV shows, movies, and 
consoles that utilize them. But without the ability to exclude low-quality or 
nonfunctioning games, these third-party products diminished the perceived 
quality of the system.
182
 
Two additional factors exacerbated this problem.  First, at the time, 
parents who—without a source of trustworthy reviews like the Internet—
often lacked knowledge of which games were high- or low-quality, 
primarily purchased video games.
183
  This allowed poor quality titles to 
generate revenue from purchases by unsophisticated buyers rather than 
being driven out of the market.  Second, at the time, most companies 
viewed video games as a way to make a small amount of extra profit 
through licensing or even as commercials themselves, not as a method of 
                                                          
181.  Ryan Lambie, The 1983 Videogame Crash: What Went Wrong, and Could it Happen 
Again?, DEN OF GEEK! (Feb. 19, 2013, 7:01 AM), http://www.denofgeek.com/games/24531/the-
1983-videogame-crash-what-went-wrong-and-could-it-happen-again#ixzz3wb4VTBo 
[http://perma.cc/55HR-PKGZ]. 
 
182.  See id. 
 
183.  See The Great Video Game Crash of 1983, TV TROPES, 
http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/UsefulNotes/TheGreatVideoGameCrashOf1983?from=M
ain.TheGreatVideoGameCrashOf1983 [http://perma.cc/5W6V-AUAT]; Nadia Oxford, Ten Facts 
About the Great Video Game Crash of ’83, IGN (Sept. 1, 2011), 
http://www.ign.com/articles/2011/09/21/ten-facts-about-the-great-video-game-crash-of-
83?page=1 [http://perma.cc/8CEJ-KZFV]. 
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building or sustaining a related but separate core brand.
184
  For this reason, 
many companies were willing to license their brands and trademarks with 
no oversight into the quality of the final product—leading to such colossal 
failures as the “E.T.: The Extra-Terrestrial” game, most copies of which 
were ultimately buried in the Mojave Desert.
185
  The end result was 
massive distrust in the market as a whole, which lead to a 97% drop in 
console profits over a one-year period and caused industry valuation to 
plummet from $3 billion to just $100 million.
186
  This may be why 
Salomon, writing just four years after the video game market crash of 1983, 
cites a concern that a FCLRRP might limit exclusivity rights when 
ultimately rejecting the suggestion as a viable solution.
187
 
While not dispositive, Salomon’s concern is valid.  Exclusive 
agreements are one way in which the industry maintains control on quality 
and establishes confidence in consumers.  But there are reasons to think 
that a lack of exclusivity for rights of publicity would have little impact in 
today’s environment.  Today’s purchasers of video games are on average 
older and more sophisticated than the purchasers in 1983 and they have 
easy access to online reviews which can help them assess which games to 
buy and which to avoid.  More importantly, rights of publicity are not 
trademarked rights, which can be used to distinguish which products are 
and are not officially licensed by the professional athletic organizations that 
sponsor them.
188
  Even under a regime that opts not to carve out an 
exception for organizations like the NFL, developers seeking to create a 
professional football simulation would be unable to use the NFL or NFL 
team logos in advertising or in-game, consequently making purchasers 
aware that, regardless of the persons being depicted on screen, the game is 
not an official NFL game.  While the business environment in 1983 saw the 
rampant and unchecked licensing of brands that were attached to inferior 
products, most businesses no longer see video game licensing as a side 
                                                          
184.  See Mark Rochester, The Video Game Market Crash of 1983, REAXXION (Nov. 
19, 2014), http://www.reaxxion.com/1364/the-video-game-market-crash-of-1983 
[http://perma.cc/V5WS-PUGL]. 
 
185.  Lambie, supra note 181. 
 
186.  Id.   
 
187.  See J. Eugene Salomon, Jr., Note, The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Case for a 
Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1197–98 (1987) (“A compulsory license could 
diminish [monetary] returns because an individual could no longer insure a user of exclusivity.”). 
 
188.  Id.  
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business without repercussions on the core brand.
189
  It was this perception, 
not the inability to exercise exclusivity, which led to many failures in 1983. 
 This does not mean that these concerns or the desires of rights 
holders for exclusivity should be ignored.  There are definite advantages to 
providing a mechanism by which rights can be assigned in an exclusive 
manner, including ensuring fair pricing and preventing consumer 
confusion.  To the extent possible, a FCLRRP should be designed to 
facilitate exclusive or quasi-exclusive dealings in rights of publicity. 
 
E. Presence of Functional Rights Aggregation and Allocation in 
Professional Sports 
 
The problems that are currently presented by rights of publicity are 
both serious and real.  The Hart and Keller decisions represent the death of 
games that generated billions.
190
  Despite the burdens of the system, in the 
context of professional athletics, the system functions quite well, delivering 
titles like NBA 2K14 and Madden NFL 25 to millions of customers.
191
  
Because these entities are able to implement uniform take-it-or-leave-it 
contracts with their players, they are able to aggregate their players’ rights 
of publicity and sell them to game developers like EA and Take-Two 
Interactive.
192
  In order to prevent a FCLRRP from potentially disturbing 
this currently functional system, a FCLRRP should either provide a 
mechanism for these functional systems to continue or be careful to ensure 
that whatever system replaces the current free market negotiations is both 
as functional and as fair as what currently exists.  A FCLRRP that creates 
efficiencies in some markets while destroying them in others may not be 
desirable.  Pragmatism suggests that, at the very least, a FCLRRP should 
generate gains in efficiency elsewhere that offset any losses in the rights 
allocation that currently exists in professional athletics, if the FCLRRP 
even touches these systems at all. 
                                                          
189.  See generally Chad Hadzinsky, A Look Into the Industry of Video Games Past, 
Present, and Yet to Come, CMC SENIOR THESES (2014), 
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/842 [http://perma.cc/7CM9-43HE]. 
 
190.  Global Weekly Chart, VGCHARTZ (Mar. 21, 2015), 
http://www.vgchartz.com/weekly/42085/Global/ [http://perma.cc/NX3S-58Q3]. 
 
191.  Id. 
 
192.  See Mazique, supra note 180.  
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Preserving the status quo where it is currently functional is not only 
justified on precautionary or utilitarian grounds: it is a political imperative.  
The enactment of a FCLRRP would require an act of Congress—a 
legislative body which in recent history has been less than prolific in its 
enactment of laws.
193
  As discussed above, a FCLRRP would generate 
value for developers and rights holders alike as it would facilitate works 
that, under current legal theories and frameworks, simply cannot legally 
and profitably be produced.  But the perception that professional athletic 
organizations might lose money or control in the process could easily 
torpedo any chance the act had to be enacted.  Justifiably, these 
organizations will argue that, for them, there is no market failure, and will 
therefore likely lobby against any regime that jeopardizes their profit from 
these enterprises.  If a proposal for a FCLRRP is to ever leave the pages of 
academic journals and make it onto the president’s desk, it must provide 
assurances to those with a vested interest that their current arrangements 
will not be jeopardized. 
 
V. THE PROPOSAL 
 
This article proposes the creation of a Federal Compulsory Licensing 
Regime for Rights of Publicity (“FCLRRP”).  A FCLRRP would allow 
creators to obtain a compulsory license covering the likenesses depicted in 
nontransformative works such as simulation sports games, preempting any 
state level right of publicity laws that might otherwise expose the creator to 
liability for the depictions in the work.  This is not a novel idea as the 
United States already provides for compulsory licensing for musical works 
and multiple scholars have proposed such a regime for rights of 
publicity.
194
  But to date, these proposals have been rudimentary.  This 
section synthesizes these works with the concerns highlighted by the Hart 
and Keller decisions—the precedent set by existing compulsory regimes 
and other areas of the law—and the observed free market transactions for 
rights of publicity to generate a concrete, actionable proposal. 
The proposed design reflects both a desire for flexibility and fairness, 
as well as the functional and political realities that accompany both 
                                                          
193.  See generally Drew DeSilver, Congress Still on Track to be Among the Least 
Productive in Recent History, PEWRESEARCHCENTER (Sept. 23, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/23/congress-still-on-track-to-be-among-least-
productive-in-recent-history/ [http://perma.cc/43Z8-3XVC]. 
 
194.  See supra Sections II.D, III.A–D.   
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enacting and enforcing a compulsory regime of this nature.  The proposed 
FCLRRP favors free market outcomes where possible, and attempts to 
emulate them where they do not exist.  It is designed to limit opportunities 
for parties to collude, holdout, or otherwise distort the market.  It seeks to 
preserve the status quo where it is functional while also providing a 
meaningful alternative where it is not functional.  Most importantly, it is a 
complete, concrete proposal.  Every element of the system, and the 
rationale behind it, is detailed such that Congress could both quickly draft a 
bill enacting the proposal wholesale and thoughtfully consider, debate, and 
amend any portion of it. 
The proposed FCLRRP creates an opt-in regime whereby developers 
of qualifying nontransformative simulation games who cannot obtain the 
needed rights of publicity through numerous individual negotiations can 
elect to use a compulsory license.  Developers opting in will have their 
application published in the Federal Register.  After a comment period, 
allowing other parties to identify defects in the work’s eligibility, the work 
will obtain a compulsory license.  The price of this license will be set by 
statute at 5% of the work’s gross revenue.  These fees would be placed in 
escrow until they reach a minimum threshold, at which point the 
distribution process would begin.  Because works will use depictions in 
differing ways, a committee will design an individualized distribution 
structure for the fees generated by each work.  The proposed distribution 
schedule will be published in the Federal Register before approval, giving 
rights holders an opportunity to object much as they do in class actions if 
they do not find it satisfactory.  Once the Copyright Royalty Board 
approves a distribution schedule, the funds will be distributed to rights 
holders in accordance with its terms.  The rest of this section discusses all 
these elements in substantial detail. 
 
A. An Opt-In Regime for Works Which Do Not Qualify for First 
Amendment Protection 
 
The proposed FCLRRP would be an opt-in regime under which the 
developer or artist of a work could opt to follow certain procedures to 
obtain compulsory licensing for his or her work.  While this article has 
focused primarily on the inefficiencies generated by the Hart and Keller 
rulings, which held that EA’s video games were not protected as 
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transformative works,
195
 all video games receive First Amendment 
protection
196
 and for most such works, this means licensing simply is not 
necessary.  Entirely fictitious works do not implicate right of publicity law 
at all.  But even those who recreate the image or likeness of another are 
often protected because their depictions are part of a transformative work, 
fall under the fair use doctrine, or are a parody of the person depicted.  
These works can continue to rely on these defenses as they have in the past. 
An opt-in system also means that for developers who can obtain 
licenses through traditional means, there is no disruption to their business 
operations.  This greatly reduces the downside risk of the system, as it 
ensures that where the commercial licensing of rights of publicity currently 
exists, it will continue to exist in the future. 
 
B. Protections Associated With Opting Into a Federal Compulsory 
Licensing Regime for Rights of Publicity 
 
Before understanding how a FCLRRP would function, it is best to 
understand what protections a developer of a game or other creative work 
would receive by opting into the system.  The background section of this 
article has explained how, at least under the majority’s interpretation in 
Hart and Keller, state-level rights of publicity severely hinder the ability of 
developers to create works using the likenesses of real persons.  A 
compulsory license under a FCLRRP would provide a way for these 
developers to license en masse the rights of publicity from the persons 
whose images it used under certain defined circumstances, greatly reducing 
their liability from right of publicity suits.  Specifically, a FCLRRP would 
provide that: 
The developer of a qualified creative work may acquire a compulsory 
license for the rights of publicity of persons depicted in that work, and no 
right of publicity or comparable claim shall be maintained against that 
developer regarding that work’s depictions of persons listed in the 
developer’s completed and approved application for such compulsory 
license, so long as the developer has otherwise fulfilled its obligations 
under this statute. 
This rule would function in a fairly straightforward manner: rights of 
publicity would be licensed by a compulsory regime and any efforts to use 
                                                          
195.  Elec. Arts Inc. v. Hart (Hart Dismissal), 717 F.3d 141, 170 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. 
dismissed, 135 S. Ct. 43 (2014).  See generally Elec. Arts Inc. v. Keller, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014). 
 
196.  Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 787 (2011). 
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state-level rights of publicity laws to bring a claim would be preempted.  
But it is worth commenting on some of the details of the regime.  First, the 
regime only allows for compulsory licensing for “qualified works.”  These 
qualifications mean that the legal landscape remains mostly unchanged.  As 
is detailed below, this means that current games that function under 
licenses from professional athletic organizations like the NFL will be 
largely unaffected, although the FCLRRP would allow for such games to 
expand their scope, say by including historical teams.  Second, the 
proposed act only limits claims based on that work’s depictions of persons.  
If the developer uses a person’s likeness for advertising or endorsement 
purposes, even for a work licensed under the FCLRRP, they will have to 
seek licenses from the individual rights holders or else face liability.  Third, 
this act does not prohibit such actions if the developer fails, through 
negligence or fraud, to fulfill its obligations under this statute.  Hopefully 
such instances will be rare, but the ability of individuals to bring lawsuits in 
such instances heavily encourages a developer to dutifully carry out its 
responsibilities.  With these caveats in mind, we turn to the first matter: 
which works should qualify for compulsory licenses under a FCLRRP? 
 
C. Works Eligible to Receive a Compulsory License Under a Federal 
Compulsory Right of Publicity Licensing Regime 
 
This article, and other contemporary scholarship, has been triggered 
by the decisions in Hart and Keller.  Naturally, this means that the 
depictions of current and former athletes in video games present 
themselves as prototypical examples of the types of works that should be 
covered.  But beyond this, deciding on the bounds of a FCLRRP requires 
balancing considerations that favor both broad and narrow application.  On 
one hand, constraining the scope of the FCLRRP means that as new 
technologies emerge, they may unintentionally be left out of the law’s 
protections, slowing growth and necessitating additional legislative action.  
On the other hand, providing broad applicability risks the act altering the 
current legal landscape in an unintended way.  Moreover, while both video 
game developers and rights of publicity holders stand to gain from a system 
that authorizes games like EA’s NCAA Football series, this may not be true 
for the economic ecosystems of other works.  For example, if the rights of 
publicity for actors could be licensed under an FCLRRP, actors might stand 
to lose substantial revenue and would, in turn, oppose the act’s passage.  
Expanding the scope of the act also means expanding the scope of those 
who might oppose it. 
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For these reasons, this article proposes defining qualified works as: 
an audiovisual work (1) depicting persons from two or more U.S. states (2) 
whose rights of publicity are owned or have been assigned to at least forty 
separate entities other than the developer (3) which does not depict the 
applicable likenesses as part of a set narrative. 
As discussed below, the forty-entities requirement limits the FCLRRP 
to developers who would face genuine hurdles in attempting to license all 
the rights separately, the minimal diversity requirement helps ensure 
constitutionality, and the lack of set narrative requirements preserves the 
political viability of the act by not disrupting the established, functional 
industries for television and motion pictures.  These requirements were also 
drafted with the understanding that many FCLRRP applications will be 
approved ex parte.  While applications for compulsory licenses will be 
listed in the Federal Register and may be opposed by a party who believes 
the requirements of the FCLRRP have not been met, often the Copyright 
Royalty Board will have to decide on its own accord whether the work 
meets the requirements.  To facilitate this, the requirements were drafted to 
be as objective as possible.  When considered along with all the checks and 
balances embodied in the FCLRRP this article proposes, these 
requirements ensure that the system is not unfairly used to bypass fair 
market dealings. 
 
1. Use of rights of publicity that are owned or have been assigned to at least 
forty separate entities other than the developer. 
 
Because the need for an FCLRRP is generated in large part by the 
complexities of attempting to individually license a large number of rights 
of publicity, a qualification based on the number of rights holders would be 
desirable.  Of course, one could imagine a FCLRRP that allowed for a 
developer of any copyrightable work to obtain a compulsory license for the 
right of publicity of any individual or set of individuals.  Such a regime 
might well be functional, but it would be tantamount to government rate-
setting for such rights.  The impetus for a FCLRRP is not that markets have 
been setting a rate that is too high or low, but that the market has not, and 
cannot, set rates where the number of parties is too numerous and the risk 
of a holdout is too high.  In instances where the market can still reasonably 
function, for example where a developer seeks a license for the depiction of 
a single person, the FCLRRP should not allow developers to circumvent 
the market.  Conversely, creative works, like those that triggered the 
lawsuits in Keller and Hart, would require obtaining licenses from 
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thousands or tens of thousands
197
 of individual players and are therefore 
prime candidates for such a license. 
Determining where the line is between licensing obligations that can 
be reasonably obtained through the market and those that require resort to a 
compulsory system is a difficult, and in some sense arbitrary, task.  
However, as addressed above, to qualify for the right to obtain a 
compulsory option, a copyrightable work must depict the likenesses of 
persons whose rights of publicity are owned or have been assigned to at 
least forty entities other than the developer.  This figure identifies situations 
in which licensing the rights through traditional negotiations with all 
parties is truly a monumental task and comports with current legal 
jurisprudence concerning numerosity. 
Since holdout problems can exist with as few as two rights holders, a 
person could reasonably argue that simply requiring the presence of 
multiple rights holders would be sufficient to identify situations in need of 
a compulsory system.
198
  But doing so ignores the reality that deals can be, 
and are, regularly negotiated under circumstances when multiple parties 
hold rights necessary for the purchaser to move forward.  Rather than set 
the threshold at the minimum justifiable level, it is better to turn to an area 
where our legal system already makes determinations about how large a 
group must be to make assembling their individual rights impractical—that 
area would be class actions. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) directs courts to certify classes 
only when they are “so numerous that joinder of class members is 
impracticable.”
199
  Courts have developed a large body of law determining 
precisely how numerous a group must be.
200
  These cases have set the 
                                                          
197.  See Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement with 
Defendant Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013) (accepting allegation that class 
contained “over 100,000 individuals” in granting preliminary approval of the class action 
settlement). 
 
198.  For example, two people might own two adjacent lots that a real estate developer 
needs to construct a shopping center.  If the developer were to purchase one lot, the owner of the 
other lot gains substantial leverage if he were to refuse the sale entirely. 
 
199.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 
200.  See Jeffrey S. Gutman, Federal Practice Manual for Legal Aid Attorneys § 7.2, 
SARGENT SHRIVER NATIONAL CENTER ON POVERTY LAW (2016), 
http://federalpracticemanual.org/node/42#14 [http://perma.cc/K4L2-YESU]; see also Gen. Tel. 
Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980) (suggesting fifteen is too few); Hayes v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 357 (3d Cir. 2013) (presuming numerosity at forty); Consol. Rail 
Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995) (presuming numerosity at forty). 
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precedent that, in general, classes under fifteen parties are too small and 
that classes greater than forty parties are sufficiently large.
201
  There are 
exceptions, of course, but as a general rule, if a class is larger than forty 
parties, it will satisfy Rule 23(a)’s numerosity requirement.
202
  Given that 
there are far fewer holdout concerns for joinder between plaintiffs when a 
tort has damaged them all, it is sensible to assume that if forty parties are 
too many, it would also be too many parties to practically negotiate 
individual licenses with. 
And lest one think the analogy improper, it is worth noting that the 
similarities between right of publicity negotiations and class actions are 
stronger than they might seem at a glance.  In the case of a right of 
publicity licensing, the developer seeks to gather rights held by numerous 
entities so that it can generate substantial value—value that cannot be 
generated by securing rights for only one or a few individuals.  In the case 
of a legal harm against a large number of people, an attorney seeks to 
gather the claims so that he or she can generate substantial value from a 
lawsuit, value that cannot be generated by one or a few individuals.
203
  Both 
the developer and the attorney have a legal means of facilitating these 
outcomes without resorting to specialty law; they can license each right 
individually or seek the voluntary joinder of all class members respectively.  
However, at a certain point, our legal system deems the effort required by a 
class action attorney to gather all those legal claims in a single place too 
costly and inefficient.  At that point, the law allows for the compulsory 
joinder of all stakeholders.
204
  This article proposes allowing developers, 
under similarly numerous circumstances, to do the same. 
While the case law on class actions suggests that requiring forty 
entities is at the higher end of the legally recognized size at which 
individual collection of rights is deemed impractical,
205
 the comparable 
                                                          
 
201.  See Gutman, supra note 200; see also Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., 446 U.S. at 330 
(suggesting fifteen is too few); Hayes, 725 F.3d at 357 (presuming numerosity at forty); Consol. 
Rail Corp., 47 F.3d at 483 (presuming numerosity at forty). 
 
202.  See Gutman, supra note 200; see also Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., 446 U.S. at 
330; Hayes, 725 F.3d at 357; Consol. Rail Corp., 47 F.3d at 483. 
 
203.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (allowing for class certification when “the class is so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable”). 
 
204.  See id. 
 
205.  Gutman, supra note 200.  
 
ELR – Bucher (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2017  5:09 PM 
98 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1 
 
requirement in a FCLRRP is further checked by the ability of rights holders 
to gather their rights together to disqualify a work from the compulsory 
licensing system.  The forty-entities requirement is about the number of 
entities who hold the rights, not who generated them.  This means that if 
all, or all but thirty-eight, rights-holders can sell their rights to, or agree to 
collectively bargain as a member of a single entity, then the compulsory 
system does not apply.  This further helps preserve the free market as the 
preferred method of rights transfers in the United States and ensures 
compulsory licenses will only be granted in situations where there are too 
many parties for negotiation to be practical.  The purpose of a federal 
regime is to prevent the expense of locating all the rights holders and to 
eliminate the possibility of a holdout.  If the rights holders can gather 
together themselves, much of this task is already accomplished. 
 
2. Presence of minimal diversity. 
 
The FCLRRP would also draw on another requirement from the Class 
Action Fairness Act: minimal diversity.
206
  The legislation would deny a 
work protection under the FCLRRP if all the persons who were depicted in 
the work resided in the same state.  Unlike the forty-entity requirement, this 
requirement mostly exists to protect the constitutionality of the legislation.  
While modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence gives the federal 
government wide latitude to pass statutes,
207
 adding a minimal diversity 
requirement means that every compulsory license will affect entities in 
multiple states and thus be firmly within the sphere of interstate commerce.  
It also allows states who have opted to favor free speech by not enacting a 
right of publicity statute to promote the use of their citizens and locations in 
creative works developed in their state.  For example, a video game 
developer creating a crime drama set in a modern-day West Coast city 
might opt to locate their headquarters and game in Portland rather than 
Seattle or Los Angeles so that they could depict real people in that city 
without being subject to any licensing requirements.
208
 
 
                                                          
206.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2011). 
 
207.  See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 112 (1942). 
 
208.  See Statutes & Interactive Map, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, 
http://rightofpublicity.com/statutes [http://perma.cc/4R99-5R6Q] (demonstrating that while both 
California and Washington have right of publicity statutes, Oregon does not). 
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3. Not applicable to depictions used in a set narrative. 
 
This requirement is meant to limit the scope of works covered so that 
developers do not use the FCLRRP in instances where its application 
would be inequitable.  There is a risk that a developer might attempt to 
acquire the rights of publicity for an individual by including forty other 
parties and using the compulsory regime to circumvent fair market 
negotiations.  To borrow an example from Kunath, imagine a developer 
with advanced CGI capabilities who creates a film starring “Katharine 
Hepburn twenty years younger.”
209
  Hepburn is thrilled at the proposal to 
create the film, but demands a large sum for her right of publicity.  Finding 
the price too high, the developer decides to place fifty other famous people, 
from various U.S. states, in various minor roles throughout the movie; it 
then applies for a compulsory license at the default rate.  This sort of 
creative endeavor, which uses numerosity to circumvent fair market 
dealings for rights of publicity, is not the type of work a FCLRRP would 
want to promote. 
Deciding where to circumscribe the bounds in this regard—where to 
draw the line between fairly using the system to create products that would 
otherwise be impossible to license and exploiting it—requires an 
understanding why the above example seems like an exploitation. It is not 
because movies should not be covered.  Video games hold no special or 
diminished place in the pantheon of creative expression.
210
  It is unfair 
because (1) the market sets a higher price for the use of a person’s image 
when they are used in a set narrative work; (2) holdout problems are 
substantially less likely to exist when casting a set narrative work; and (3) 
set narrative works are more likely to draw on a few prominent depictions 
disproportionately. 
While there is no standard budget for casting in set narrative works, 
there is at least anecdotal evidence that the cost for publicity rights is much 
higher than that calculated for rights of publicity discussed later in this 
                                                          
209.  Kunath, supra note 79, at 866. 
 
210.  See Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 789 (2011) (“Whatever the 
challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, ‘the basic principles of 
freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary’ when a new 
and different medium for communication appears.”). 
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article.
211
  For example, the producers of Unbreakable dedicated $35 
million—out of a $74.2 million budget—to the cost of the cast.
212
  The film 
grossed $248 million worldwide, implying a rate equivalent to 14.1% of 
gross revenue—a figure nearly three times the default rate for the proposed 
FCLRRP.
213
 
Whatever the cost of obtaining the rights of publicity, works with a 
set narrative also do not suffer from the holdout concerns faced in creating 
a historically accurate simulation.  While not all narrative works have a 
single prominent figure, almost all have less than a few dozen characters of 
note.  The FCLRRP is supposed to resolve the practical difficulties that 
emerge from needing to license a large number of specific people.  For 
example, an accurate simulation of NCAA football requires complete and 
accurate team rosters from every team depicted.  If Slippery Rock’s left 
tackle will not sign a deal, you can no longer have a completely accurate 
simulation.  But when expressing a set narrative, specific persons are rarely 
required so holdout problems disappear.  What if Slippery Rock’s left 
tackle will not agree to be depicted in a story about a Division II team 
being transferred to Division I and winning the National Championship?  
The developer can solve this problem by going to Shippensburg or any 
other Division II team and make the pitch.  There is no need for a 
compulsory licensing regime. 
Finally, creative works with set narratives tend to draw on the persons 
depicted in an intentionally disparate manner.  The leads get by far the 
most screen time while extras are used only once.  While a FCLRRP 
committee is designed to be flexible, constructing a fair distribution when a 
few people occupy the vast majority of the work would be more difficult 
than when avatar presence is more evenly spread.  Likely, any distribution 
would leave either the “stars” or the “extras” feeling undercompensated—
compounding the compensation issue addressed above.  In short, works 
depicting set narratives neither need nor benefit from inclusion in a 
compulsory license system so they should be excluded from its scope. 
None of this is to suggest that qualified works cannot or will not have 
powerful narratives.  The limitation is only on the use of compulsory 
                                                          
211.  Hollywood by the Numbers: Unbreakable, THE SMOKING GUN (Apr. 14, 2000), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060905202743/http://www.thesmokinggun.com/hollywood/hollyw
oodsides/willisunbreakable1.html [http://perma.cc/54KB-C7X3]. 
 
212.  Id. 
 
213.  Unbreakable, BOX OFFICE MOJO, 
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=unbreakable.htm [http://perma.cc/GG9B-KN6Y]. 
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licenses for the individuals depicted in set narratives.  This in no way limits 
the powerful emergent narratives generated by the player’s interaction with 
the game or other qualified work.  When the player is guiding and 
generating that narrative by contributing their own actions, the FCLRRP 
still allows for likenesses to be licensed through its compulsory structure so 
long as the developer does not orchestrate the narrative to achieve a certain 
predetermined end or a small set of possible ends. 
Even if a developer would like to express a set narrative as part of a 
greater simulation, he or she may do so by obtaining individual licenses 
from the persons depicted in the narrative and licensing all other likenesses 
through the compulsory system.  If a developer wants to create a NCAA 
football simulation but also have a story mode for that Division II underdog 
story, it can get the necessary licenses for the set narrative elements from 
the individuals while using the FCLRRP for every other NCAA player.  
Alternatively, if the set narrative the developer wishes to tell is 
transformative and it is willing to risk the litigation, the developer need not 
acquire licenses at all and can instead utilize the First Amendment 
protection for transformative uses of celebrities’ likenesses. 
 As discussed above, because of the possibility of ex parte approval of 
a FCLRRP application by the Copyright Review Board, the qualifications 
for approval are ideally as objective as possible.  While the diversity and 
numerosity requirements are purely objective, determining whether a game 
depicts listed persons in a set narrative will be a somewhat subjective task.  
The Copyright Royalty Board is unlikely to need to go on a fact-finding 
mission to make this determination however.  Developers must already 
prepare “a DVD that captures all pertinent content, including typical 
gameplay, missions, and cut scenes” for the ESRB rating board.
214
  This 
same content can be provided to the Copyright Royalty Board (under seal) 
as evidence of the lack of set narrative.  Further, as discussed in the 
previous section, if a developer fails to fulfill his or her obligations under 
the FCLRRP, an adversely affected rights holder may still sue him or her.  
Thus, even if the Copyright Royalty Board ends up functioning as a de 
facto rubberstamp, consequently finding all applications lack a set 
narrative, there is still a strong incentive for the developer to comply. 
 
D. Exemption for Qualifying Organizations That Aggregate a Substantial 
Number of Rights of Publicity 
                                                          
214.  See ESRB Ratings Process, ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE RATING BOARD, 
http://www.esrb.org/ratings/ratings_process.jsp [http://perma.cc/6Q47-4KXS]. 
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For the reasons discussed at length above, the compulsory system is 
designed with an eye towards achieving both fairness and efficiency.  
Whether these aims are actualized or not by any implementation of the 
proposed FCLRRP, its enactment is neither desirable nor feasible if the 
system does not preserve the functional exchanges made by professional 
athletic leagues.  To that end, this article proposes carving out an 
exemption for certain qualified organizations applicable to both existing 
organizations that successfully aggregate rights of publicity and similarly 
functional organizations that might arise in the future.  Such organizations 
would have to meet three qualifications to be exempt from the compulsory 
system: (1) they must gather a large number of rights; (2) they must be 
registered to give developers notice that the rights they possess are not 
subject to compulsory licensing; and (3) they must be actively engaged in 
the commercial sale of the rights they have aggregated. 
 
1. Large. 
 
The core motivations behind the compulsory system are reducing the 
cost developer’s burden of gathering rights one-by-one and eliminating the 
ability of a single rights holder to hold up a developer by refusing to sell a 
single likeness necessary to complete a set of rights needed for an 
historically accurate simulation.  If organizations were permitted to exclude 
themselves from the FCLRRP with only a handful of rights of publicity, 
rights holders would easily circumvent the system.  The successful 
licensing seen with professional athletic organizations is in large part due to 
the fact that these organizations hold a large number of rights, usually the 
complete set of rights necessary for a developer to produce a game in a 
given genre.
215
  In order for aggregating organizations to be similarly 
successful, they must be similarly sized. 
While the possession of a large set of rights is a necessary condition 
for an aggregating organization to be effective, there is no clear indication 
of how large is large enough.  Almost certainly, the necessary size to 
                                                          
215.  See, e.g., MADDEN NFL 25 (EA Sports, PlayStation 3/PlayStation 4/Xbox 360/Xbox 
One/iOS/Android CD-ROM 2013); GRAND THEFT AUTO V (Rockstar Games, Win./PlayStation 
3/PlayStation 4/Xbox 360/Xbox One CD-ROM 2013); Brian Mazique, Building the Perfect 
Football Game to Coexist with ‘Madden’, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2016, 9:53 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/brianmazique/2016/03/04/building-the-perfect-football-game-to-
coexist-with-madden/#2140da837d30 [http://perma.cc/2E5M-2AD2]. 
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achieve efficient transactions will vary based on the nature of the 
bargained-for rights of publicity.  The more complete the set of rights is, 
the better.  But what constitutes a complete set will depend on the needs of 
the developer.  As a purely theoretical matter, it might be ideal to require 
the organization to possess all rights needed by the creator of a qualified 
creative work, but these needs will likely change from developer to 
developer and work to work.  Thus, it would be difficult, if not impossible, 
to impose complete aggregation as a condition for exemption.  Instead, 
whatever threshold is set by statute, it must aim to optimize the number of 
functional structures that would be included in the exemption’s purview 
while minimizing the potential for opportunistic organizations attempting 
to circumvent rather than complement the FCLRRP. 
Whereas contemplation of the theoretical threshold for efficient 
exchanges does little to suggest a firm number of rights which must be 
aggregated by a qualifying organization, the political necessity of the 
exemption is much more illuminating.  If the major professional athletic 
organizations in the United States—the NFL, NHL, MLB, and NBA—are 
unable to qualify, any attempt to pass the act is doomed to fail.
216
  This 
means that, at a maximum, the threshold must be set such that the number 
of rights of publicity aggregated by these organizations is sufficient for 
them to qualify.  These organizations all have thirty teams,
217
 with the 
exception of the NFL, which has thirty-two teams.
218
  The active roster 
limits set by these leagues are twenty-three players for the NHL,
219
 fifteen 
                                                          
216.  See Glenn McGraw, Which Pro Sport Generates The Most Revenue, FOX SPORTS 
(May 14, 2014, 6:37 PM), http://www.foxsports.com/buzzer/story/which-pro-sport-generates-the-
most-revenue-051414 [http://perma.cc/9QH9-SSTV] (Despite the growing importance of 
professional soccer in the United States, it is not included in this list because its total revenue—
and lobbying ability—is still dwarfed by other major league sports.  Moreover, the intellectual 
property rights of U.S. soccer clubs tend to be organized on a team-by-team basis, rather than 
league wide); see also Delegation of the United States, Roundtable on Competition and Sports, 70 
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 2 n.4 (2010) 
(demonstrating that many of these rights of publicity overlap with those held by international 
organizations); Carolina Pina, The Role of IP for Athletes and Image Rights, GARRIGUES 1, 3 
www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/en/wipo_reg_ip_sport_sin_14/wipo_reg_ip_sport_sin_14_t_11.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/B4NA-UHKB] (raising questions about whether the MLS would be able to 
generate the same efficient outcomes as seen with other major professional sports licensing). 
 
217.  Teams, NBA (2016), http://www.nba.com/teams/ [http://perma.cc/G3KU-7VPT]; 
Teams, NHL (2015), http://www.nhl.com/info/teams [http://perma.cc/BC94-PEAF]; Team-by-
Team Information, MLB (2016), http://mlb.mlb.com/team/ [http://perma.cc/QGN4-3QR9]. 
 
218.  Teams, NFL (2016), http://www.nfl.com/teams [http://perma.cc/28GB-3XFB]. 
 
219.  Hockey Operations Guidelines, NHL (2015), 
http://www.nhl.com/ice/page.htm?id=26377 [http://perma.cc/K8SW-VMUN]. 
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for the NBA,
220
 twenty-five for the MLB,
221
 and fifty-three for the NFL.
222
  
Thus, the fewest rights of publicity controlled by any existing major 
professional sports organization in the United States is the 450 players 
licensable by the NBA.
223
 
Given the absence of a compelling justification for setting the 
threshold elsewhere and the holdup danger possessed when rights holders 
are exempt from the compulsory system, the number of rights aggregated 
required to qualify for exemption should be set at 450 likenesses.  
Undoubtedly, this will be viewed as shameless pandering to the existing 
interests of these organizations, but in the case of rights of publicity, it is 
justified.  In an otherwise failed system, these professional athletic 
organizations have produced efficient and functional transactions, licensing 
the rights to developers who in turn produce profitable products.  This is 
not a situation where the exclusion of these organizations represents a 
government handout or indirect subsidy.  The exclusion instead reflects the 
recognition that the current system is not a complete failure and an 
equitable provision that ensures the FCLRRP does not punish those 
organizations that have been successful simply because others have not 
been.  It is also a precautionary measure that ensures that should the 
FCLRRP fail to be efficient, functional, or practical, it at least leaves us no 
worse off than under current law. 
 
2. Registered. 
 
Those organizations wishing to opt out of the compulsory regime will 
need to register their organizations and the rights of publicity they hold 
with a central government organization, much as copyrights and 
                                                          
 
220.  Ira Winderman, Heat Down to NBA Limit With Five Cuts; Ennis Guarantee 
Reworked, SUNSENTINEL (Oct. 24, 2015, 5:26 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/sports/miami-
heat/sfl-miami-heat-nba-roster-s102415-story.html [http://perma.cc/DGJ6-LBRJ]. 
 
221.  Arizona Phil, MLB Roster Rules, CUB REPORTER, 
http://www.thecubreporter.com/book/export/html/3506 [http://perma.cc/7A4H-4DT4]. 
 
222.  Mike Wobschall, Roster Rules Refresher: Practices Squad, IR, PUP, MINN. 
VIKINGS (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.vikings.com/news/article-1/Roster-Rules-Refresher-
Practices-Squad-IR-PUP/179442f4-7ce6-48e7-a112-441c3718b26e [http://perma.cc/HBD8-
RB2N]. 
 
223.  Thirty teams with a roster of fifteen players would total 450 players, assuming no 
additional contracted players are off the active rosters. 
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trademarks are currently registered.  Registration is an administrative but 
important requirement. Under the FCLRRP, the ability to use compulsory 
licensing to obtain the needed rights of publicity will be presumed, and 
potential developers will need a way to search the contemplated rights to 
ensure they are not exempt from compulsory licensing by virtue of being 
held by a qualified aggregator.  Such registration should be digitized to 
facilitate the search and should include the contract information of the 
registering organization to facilitate active bargaining for those rights. 
 
3. Active. 
 
Organizations wishing to be exempt from compulsory licensing must 
be actively involved in licensing those rights.  This requirement is 
necessary lest the exemption for large rights aggregators become a 
loophole by which individuals could opt out of the system and generate 
precisely the inefficiencies the system sets out to solve.  If an organization 
was permitted to aggregate rights of publicity and then merely sit on them, 
refusing to license them to any entity, an individual or other rights holder 
could join the organization as a method of excluding him or herself from 
compulsory licensing.  Requiring that an organization have the genuine 
intent of licensing its catalog of rights prevents this behavior. 
This article rejects setting formal requirements or tests to determine if 
an organization is actively engaged in licensing rights.  Certainly, such 
features could be contemplated.  For example, Kunath’s proposal that each 
rights holder be statutorily required to agree to a certain number of licenses 
a year ensures that a rights holder—whether an aggregator or not—is 
actively engaged in licensing the right(s) of publicity held. 
224
  Such 
requirements, however, introduce their own problems that jeopardize the 
administrability and efficiency of the system.  How does one decide which 
side—the licensor or licensee—is holding up negotiations?  And if more 
than one license is required, what of the gains from exclusivity discussed 
above?  Such requirements would, at the very least, also necessitate the 
sanctioning of rate court proceedings comparable to those seen with 
ASCAP to adjudicate situations where one or both sides feel a potential 
licensing deal was not fairly reached.  This, of course, would generate more 
litigation, precisely what clear rules would be intended to prevent. 
This is not to say that the vague, overarching language of being 
actively engaged in the licensing of those rights would not also generate 
                                                          
224.  Kunath, supra note 79, at 904. 
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litigation.  As a practical matter, this litigation would impact and deter 
those organizations whose efficiency is dubious, while the existing frame 
used by major professional athletic associations would survive.  At worst, 
the requirement would make it difficult for new rights aggregators to 
establish themselves, but this is not necessarily bad.  Exceptions should 
remain exceptional.  Imposing the requirement that organizations wishing 
to opt out of the system prove active commercial use of their rights of 
publicity comparable to that seen in the active licensing by current major 
professional sports organizations would ensure the FCLRRP allows for the 
acquisition of rights everywhere except where a truly vibrant and 
functioning system exists. 
 
E. Use of a Statutory Default Rate of 5% of Gross Revenue 
 
This article expresses a preference for fair market dealings where they 
can be simulated.  As detailed above, when a single entity owns, or has 
been assigned for negotiating purposes, a substantial number of rights of 
publicity and is actively engaged in licensing those rights, the rate should 
be negotiated between the developer and the rights aggregator.  However, a 
qualified rights aggregator will not always be present or have all the needed 
rights of publicity for the developer’s current project.  In these situations, a 
default rate of 5% of gross revenue should be used to compensate all, or all 
other, rights holders.  A percentage of gross revenue rate structure aligns 
the incentives of developers and rights holders and ensures that exorbitant 
fees do not chill small developers seeking to exercise their constitutional 
right to speech.  While a wide range of default rates could be reasonably 
argued for, this article finds that a rate of 5% best approximates that which 
is found in comparable rights markets. 
 
1. Use of a percentage of gross revenue fee structure. 
 
This article proposes that the default rate at which the rights of 
publicity are licensed be a percentage of gross revenue generated from the 
sale of the work using the likenesses.  While there are many other rate 
structures seen in both the right of publicity context and in other 
compulsory licensing schemes, using a percentage of gross revenue has a 
number of advantages over all alternatives.  Unlike a lump-sum fee or a 
fixed fee per unit sold, a percentage of gross revenue at least loosely 
rewards more famous persons commensurate with the added value of their 
fame, accommodates the full range of income generation models seen in 
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interactive entertainment, and ensures that small or individual developers 
are not excluded from the market. 
 
a. A percentage of a gross revenue model at least loosely rewards more 
famous persons commensurate with the added value of their fame. 
 
If we think a game title or other work’s success is influenced by the 
fame of the persons whose likeness it portrays—which, to think a person 
deserves compensation at all for their appearance in these works, we 
must—then a revenue model should seek to compensate the individuals at 
least somewhat proportionately with the demonstrated value of their fame.  
Determining that precise value is a complex task that is discussed in more 
detail in the distribution section of this article, but only a model based on a 
percentage of revenue generates value at all commensurate with the 
influence of the individuals depicted.  If a lump-sum price were charged, 
the value added by an individual’s fame would in no way be captured, as 
any increased sales resulting from the person’s notoriety would not 
translate into additional revenue for the rights holder.  While a price-per-
unit model would reflect additional marginal sales with additional revenue 
to the rights holder, it would not capture any increase in the viable sales 
price for the product.  For example, a developer might create two football 
games using the same engine and mechanics systems, one simulating 
college football and the other high school football.  Both works would 
qualify for federal compulsory licensing protection, but we might 
realistically expect that the college football game might be able to 
command a higher sales price because of its wider appeal and the 
significantly greater notoriety of its players.  Under either a per-unit or 
lump-sum regime, there would be no corresponding additional 
compensation to the college-level players even though their fame added 
more value to the finished product. 
 
b. A per-unit model cannot possibly accommodate the full range of income 
generation models seen in interactive entertainment. 
 
Video games draw on a wide range of revenue generation models.  
Some developers sell licenses to their games in a traditional fashion that 
mimics physical goods’ sales markets.
225
  These developers use physical 
                                                          
225.  See, e.g., MADDEN NFL 25 (EA Sports, PlayStation 3/PlayStation 4/Xbox 360/Xbox 
One/iOS/Andriod CD-ROM 2013); see also GRAND THEFT AUTO V (Rockstar Games, 
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and digital retailers to sell their games for a fixed fee.
226
  But this model is 
hardly ubiquitous in the industry.  Historically, arcades have rented the use 
of games and accompanying equipment by time or plays.
227
  While the 
traditional arcade’s prevalence has faded in the twenty-first century, its 
conceptual successors boom in the form of PC bangs, especially in foreign 
markets like Korea.
228
  These PC bangs rent the use of high-performance 
computers in dedicated centers, although they generally obtain their 
licenses for the games themselves on a fixed-fee basis.
229
  Many online 
games charge a monthly subscription fee to generate all or part of their 
revenue
230
 and console manufacturers like Sony and Microsoft offer a 
subscription service to access the multiplayer content of the games made 
for their consoles.
231
  Increasingly, developers generate revenue through the 
sale of optional add-on content, sometimes referred to as downloadable 
content or DLC.
232
  This content can take the form of additional story 
elements,
233
 power-ups for a player’s online avatar,
234
 or cosmetic 
                                                          
Win./PlayStation 3/PlayStation 4/Xbox 360/Xbox One CD-ROM 2013) (sold as whole games for 
in-home gaming consoles). 
 
226.  See Joost van Dreunen, A Business History of Video Games: Revenue Models From 
1980 to Today, COLUM. INST. FOR TELE-INFO. 1, 6–7 (2011). 
 
227.  Id. 
 
228.  Will Wei, What It’s Like Inside a ‘PC Bang’ in South Korea, TECHINSIDER (Oct. 18, 
2015, 10:27 AM), http://www.techinsider.io/south-korea-gaming-pc-bang-2015-10 
[http://perma.cc/4TV9-FPBE]. 
 
229.  Cho Mu-Hyun, Nexon Halves Royalties From PC Bangs, KOREA TIMES (Mar. 22, 
2013, 5:01 PM), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/tech/2016/06/134_1322570.html 
[http://perma.cc/Z85F-GNFL]. 
 
230.  See van Dreunen, supra note 226, at 8–9. 
 
231.  See, e.g., MICROSOFT’S XBOX LIVE, http://www.xbox.com/en-US/live 
[http://perma.cc/3ZGG-GJBB]; PlayStation Network, SONY (2016), 
http://www.playstation.com/en-us/network/ [http://perma.cc/2X6L-EHB5]. 
 
232.  See, e.g., Crusader Kings II, STEAM (2016), 
http://store.steampowered.com/app/203770/ [http://perma.cc/W9PA-8HZW] (charging base game 
prices of $39.99, but which has 58 pieces of “DLC” which can be purchased on Steam for a total 
of $241.43 based on prices viewed on July 24, 2016).  
 
233.  See, e.g., THE WITCHER 3: WILD HUNT - BLOOD AND WINE (CD Projekt Red, 
PlayStation 4/Xbox One/Win. CD-ROM 2016). 
 
234.  See, e.g., Gems, CLASH ROYALE WIKIA, http://clashroyale.wikia.com/wiki/Gems 
[http://perma.cc/922B-JXN8]. 
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modifications to a player’s online image.
235
  Still, others use a combination 
of the above models to generate revenue, for example charging a fixed fee 
for a license to the base game, requiring a monthly subscription fee to play 
the game, and also selling game expansions that unlock additional content 
for a one-time fee.
236
  Unlike mechanical rights for songs that can be 
realistically tied to physical or digital distribution of copies that can be 
replayed on-demand, the methods of monetizing games vary too greatly for 
a system that is dependent on sales, or any other monetization event, to 
function.  Instead, the system must bypass the monetization process, either 
assigning a price at the outset in the form of a lump sum or at the end in the 
form of a percentage of gross revenue. 
 
c. Only a percentage-of-revenue model realistically allows for small or 
individual developers to create games drawing on the likenesses of a large 
number of persons. 
 
A lump-sum model would require any developer seeking to take 
advantage of a FCLRRP to front a large sum, excluding new and smaller 
developers who could not afford the fee.  While capital markets could 
correct this problem, in theory, any lump-sum fee sufficiently large enough 
to provide meaningful compensation to truly famous persons would also 
likely put such rights out of the reach of new and unproven developers 
without creditworthiness or assets to serve as collateral.  A per-unit model 
presents these same developers with a different problem: they are 
effectively forced to set a minimum price for their works lest they lose 
money per sale.  An independent or individual developer, particularly a 
new one, will realistically be equipped only to create shorter, less in-depth, 
and ultimately lower priced, works.  A meaningful per-unit price would 
therefore likewise exclude them from the market. 
A percentage of gross revenue model, on the other hand, encourages 
innovation and risk taking.  If the resulting game is a flop, the liability to 
the licensee is limited by the work’s success.  If it is a massive success, 
those rewards are shared with rights holders, but a failure is never 
compounded by the use of rights of publicity.  In this way, a percentage of 
gross revenue model encourages innovation and competition within the 
                                                          
 
235.  See, e.g., Champion & Skin Sale: 09.09-09.12, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS, 
http://na.leagueoflegends.com/en/news/store [http://perma.cc/W83L-LNH6]. 
 
236.  See, e.g., WORLD OF WARCRAFT (Blizzard Entm’t, Mac/Win. Online 2004). 
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entertainment industry, facilitating a robust industry and ultimately 
generating more compensation for rights holders. 
If a qualified rights aggregator exists, then that stakeholder is free to 
negotiate a rate based on any metric, mitigating the risk that the statutory 
default rate structure will make the creation of works commercially 
unviable.  Like the price itself, the rate structure could be modified during 
any negotiations with a qualified rights aggregator.  This means that if a 
rate structure based on a percentage of revenue simply was not 
commercially viable or optimal for a given work or class of works, the 
parties could set a different one through the use of qualified rights 
aggregators.  For example, if a given work were going to be sold in a 
traditional per-unit manner, the parties might prefer a flat fee per-unit to 
avoid the disclosure and accounting required to determine the amount of 
revenue the work generated.  Perhaps a developer might be incentivized to 
enter a new and risky genre—say, a Major League Ultimate (professional 
Frisbee) simulator—by agreeing to pay a high royalty but only once sales 
meet a minimum revenue generation threshold.  The ability for the parties 
to set a full range of royalty options when a qualified rights aggregator is 
present means that the default rate structure need not be perfect, or even 
functional, for every possible work: it must merely be practicable for most 
of them.  Among the rate structures seen in both the market and other 
compulsory regimes, a percentage of revenue model best accomplishes that 
purpose. 
 
2. The compulsory rate should be set at 5% in light of the rates imposed by 
other compulsory licensing systems, the rates found in comparable market 
transactions, and other relevant considerations. 
 
As is the case in any compulsory licensing regime, finding a 
comparison rate that provides definitive guidance on whether a statutorily 
imposed rate is reasonable is a difficult, often impossible, task.  Still, 
comparisons to other licensing markets, when taken together, can help 
ensure that a compulsory licensing regime sets a reasonable rate in light of 
the value added by the licensed rights.  Below, this article reviews possible 
sources of comparison and concludes that a rate of 5% would be a 
reasonable default rate for a federal compulsory licensing regime for rights 
of publicity. 
 
a. Rates charged under existing compulsory licensing regimes. 
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As noted above, a FCLRRP would not be the first compulsory 
licensing regime for intellectual property rights in the United States.  For 
more than a decade, the Copyright Royalty Board has gone about the task 
of determining what rates constitute fair market value under the 
compulsory licensing regimes for performance rights and mechanical 
rights.
237
  Because these rates reflect not just congressional and judicial 
performance, but also the rates reached as a result of negotiations with 
aggregating entities like ASCAP, they provide genuine insight into both the 
market’s and the government’s view on what represents a fair rate for 
intellectual property rights. Further, because the Federal Register also 
published proposed rates,
238
 they are readily available for comparison in a 
way that the current prices paid for rights of publicity by game developers 
are not.  For these reasons, the rates charged for these intellectual property 
rights provide solid initial guidance on what an appropriate royalty rate 
might be for a right of publicity. 
 
i. Rates charged by ASCAP, the largest Performing Rights Organization. 
 
The performance rights for copyrighted musical works are negotiated 
by three Performing Rights Organizations, as explained in detail in Section 
III.  Of these three Performing Rights Organizations, ASCAP is the 
largest.
239
  Due to recent litigation with Pandora,
240
 there is not only 
accurate and up-to-date information on what these rates are but also a fresh 
determination of the range of prices that are considered reasonable fair 
market rates by the Copyright Royalty Board.  ASCAP licenses the 
performance right for its catalog of songs at a rate of 1.7% of gross revenue 
to radio stations that are part of the Radio Music Licensing Committee 
(“RMLC”).
241
  While ASCAP sought a substantially higher rate for 
                                                          
237.  See generally Copyright Royalty & Distribution Reform Act of 2004, H.R. 1417, 
108th Cong. (2004). 
 
238.  See, e.g., Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for Noncommercial 
Broadcasting, 77 Fed. Reg. 24662, 24665–67 (proposed Apr. 25, 2012) (to be codified at 37 
C.F.R. 381). 
 
239.  See generally 2015 Annual Report, ASCAP 1 (2015), 
http://www.ascap.com/about/annualreport.aspx [http://perma.cc/7QJT-CZ9G]. 
 
240.  See generally In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 
241.  See id. at 326 (stating that the rate paid by RMLC to ASCAP is 1.7% for all its 
stations, including digital retransmissions and iHeartRadio’s customizable experience). 
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Pandora, arguing that the listener’s ability to customize radio stations 
warranted a higher rate, the recent ruling by the Copyright Royalty Board 
awarded ASCAP only a modest increase, setting the rate at 1.85%.
242
 
Because copyrights on musical works are divided into six separate 
categories, it is important to understand what right ASCAP is licensing to 
accurately compare it to a publicity right.  ASCAP’s right covers the 
performance of a work, including broadcast performance, which, as 
explained above, does not give a purchaser unlimited use of a song in any 
form.  ASCAP’s licenses cover “spinning” of tracks rather than outright 
sales.  The performance right for music is in many ways analogous to the 
right of publicity, which covers the final representation of a person’s 
likeness, not all, or even any, particular images depicting the same.  Like 
the uses contemplated by video game developers, the right of performance 
is the right to use the underlying recognizable aspects of the property rather 
than a precise replication of it.
243
  The creative works that have sparked 
contemporary litigation, such as the NCAA football series, do not seek to 
show precise recordings or photos of athletes; rather, they seek to use the 
athlete’s likeness to allow customers to play out their own novel games 
utilizing the developer’s engine.  Like a band covering another artist’s song 
in a live performance, the developers are seeking to invoke the notoriety 
captured in the underlying right but are not seeking to replicate the talent or 
ability of the right holder.  And like the musician performing the live cover, 
a developer contributes his or her own talents and style to create a new, 
desirable experience for his or her audience.  For this reason, the ASCAP 
rates for performance rights provide a reasonable, if imperfect, benchmark 
for a right of publicity royalty rate. 
 
ii. Rates set by the Copyright Royalty Board for the mechanical rights to a 
song or composition. 
 
Another comparison from compulsory licensing regimes for music is 
the rate set for the mechanical rights to a song.  These rights are necessary 
for a musician who, covering another’s song and recording it, wishes to 
distribute copies of those covers.  This rate is currently 9.10 cents per song 
                                                          
242.  See id. at 353–57. 
 
243.  See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576–77 (1977) (stating 
that the First Amendment does not give a third party the right to appropriate a performer’s “entire 
act”). 
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sold.
244
  Figures on the average price paid for a distributed song are 
impossible to gather, but accepting credible estimates that the average song 
sold in the United States sells for $1.29 on iTunes, this implies a percentage 
of gross revenue of 7%.
245
 
The rate for mechanical rights probably presents an even closer 
analogy to the rights of publicity sought by game companies than 
performance rights since games are traditionally (although as addressed 
above, by no means always) distributed as digital works, just like the songs 
that carry mechanical licenses.  Like recorded covers of other songs, a 
developer using the likeness of others in an accurate way is capturing the 
essence of the original while also imparting his own style, a right possessed 
by those who cover, record, and distribute others’ songs.  If artists may use 
the lyrics of another’s song and then apply their own talent to create a 
separate work and pay an effective rate of 7%, it does not seem 
unreasonable that developers using the factual information and likeness of 
real players should be allowed to sell their creative works for the same 
effective fee. 
 
iii. Regulatory rates governing interactive, on-demand streaming services 
like Spotify. 
 
Services that broadcast musical works to listeners on demand, like 
Spotify, pay a rate codified at 10.5%.
246
  This rate includes both the 
performance and mechanical rights.  This rate may provide a reasonable 
analogy, particularly for those works that rely on a robust multiplayer 
network and developer-provided services for play.  A player of the NCAA 
football series can go online, select any team (and assorted players and 
their likenesses), and play a game against an online opponent who has done 
the same.  This is roughly analogous to a person logging onto Spotify and 
selecting the song he or she wants to hear.  Moreover, if we view the 
distribution of the game as analogous to the mechanical right, and the 
display of the game to the player as analogous to a performance right, then 
                                                          
244.  Dale Kawashima, An Overview of Mechanical Royalty Rates, SONGWRITER 
UNIVERSE, http://www.songwriteruniverse.com/mechanical.html [http://perma.cc/67JM-Y8LC]. 
 
245.  Sara Yin, iTunes Store Costs Apple $1.3 Billion Per Year?, PCMAG (June 14, 2011, 
5:21 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2386926,00.asp [http://perma.cc/69XC-796Z]. 
 
246.  See Rates & Terms for Use of Musical Works Under Compulsory License for 
Making and Distrib. of Physical & Digital Phonorecords, 37 C.F.R. § 385.12(c) (2009). 
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perhaps the rate that captures this rate jointly—i.e., the rate codified in 37 
C.F.R. § 385.12
247
—is a good estimate for a default price under a federal 
compulsory licensing regime for the right of publicity. 
 
iv. Rates charged by SoundExchange for sound recordings. 
 
Since 1995, sound recording copyright owners (“SRCOs”) have held 
a digital performance right in the broadcasting or other performance of that 
sound recording.  SoundExchange collects royalties from digital 
broadcasters, like Pandora, and distributes them to SRCOs.
248
  
SoundExchange’s rate structure is complicated, with different policies 
based on broadcaster size and type.
249
  Licenses are a combination of lump-
sum minimum fees, per-play fixed rates, and percentage of gross revenue 
rates,
250
 making calculations of comparable effective rates difficult.  
However, Pureplay Webcasters are charged a minimum of 25% of gross 
revenue and Small Webcasters are charged a minimum of 10%.
251
  Because 
larger broadcasters are charged a fixed per-play rate, a precise figure 
cannot be calculated for them.
252
  However, a recent court decision noted 
that Pandora pays over 50% of its gross revenue to SoundExchange.
253
 
These figures suggest a much higher rate than do the comparisons to 
other compulsory licenses.  However, of the compulsory regimes for 
musical copyrights addressed here, SoundExchange is easily the poorest 
comparison to the use of publicity rights in video games and other creative 
                                                          
247.  Id. 
 
248.  General FAQ, SOUNDEXCHANGE (2014), 
http://www.soundexchange.com/about/general-faq/ [http://perma.cc/NS4F-E3B4]. 
 
249.  2016 Rates, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/service-
provider/rates/ [http://perma.cc/3S9P-Z6DU]. 
 
250.  See, e.g., Commercial Webcaster 2016 Rates, SOUNDEXCHANGE, 
http://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/rates/commercial-webcaster 
[http://perma.cc/EEN6-TA8E]. 
 
251.  See Pureplay Webcaster, SOUNDEXCHANGE, 
http://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/commercial-webcaster/pureplay-webcaster/ 
[http://perma.cc/TY49-KSM7]; see also Small Webcaster, SOUNDEXCHANGE, 
http://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/commercial-webcaster/small-webcaster/ 
[http://perma.cc/K46K-QAHC]. 
 
252.  See Commercial Webcaster 2016 Rates, supra note 250.  
 
253.  See In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
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works.  These rates are charged for the performance of a specific digital 
recording of a song, not the song itself.  There is a clear analogy to the use 
of images in games, but it is the developers who create and distribute the 
specific digital reproductions of the person’s likeness; thus they, not the 
rights holders, would be the ones collecting comparable fees.  Just as it is 
the record labels, not the songwriters and composers, who earn the revenue 
from SoundExchange, if an equivalent right were established in the digital 
replications contained in a game or other work, it would be the developer 
who would collect the revenue.  For this reason, while analogies can 
appropriately be made between the licenses provided for other musical 
rights and the license contemplated by a FCLRRP, the rate charged by 
SoundExchange does not provide sensible guidance for setting a default 
rate for rights of publicity. 
 
 
b. Rates found in comparable market transactions. 
 
Besides comparing the proposed rate to those that exist under existing 
compulsory licensing regimes, it is sensible to compare this rate to existing 
market transactions for these rights.  In theory, such a comparison would 
provide even more credible guidance than the above regimes, which deal 
with copyrights for music rather than publicity rights for interactive 
entertainment.  However, in practice, such comparisons are difficult 
because the lack of publicly available data means that assumptions must be 
made that, if inaccurate, could result in widely inaccurate calculations.  For 
example, while total sales figures and release prices for video games are 
publicly available, the average purchase price is not, meaning that 
calculating gross revenue requires using a rough estimate of average sales 
price.  If these estimates are substantially different from the true figures, 
then any estimates will be as well. 
Further, license agreements for the right to create games using a 
professional athletic organization’s intellectual property do not distinguish 
(at least publicly) between the various intellectual property rights that are 
being bundled.
254
  When Take-Two Interactive purchases the right to make 
the NBA 2K series, they are purchasing not only the aggregated publicity 
rights of the players, but also the trademark rights associated with the teams 
                                                          
254.  2013 Annual Report, TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE SOFTWARE, INC. 1, 52, 
http://ir.take2games.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=86428&p=irol-reportsAnnual [http://perma.cc/8V98-
JEWQ]. 
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and the organization, the organization’s endorsement of the game, and an 
implicit fee for the aggregation of all these rights.
255
  Given the prominence 
of trademarks associated with professional athletic teams, it is likely that 
the bulk of the purchase price reflects the value of this right, as well as the 
endorsement.  In the case of the Madden series, this price also includes the 
right to be the exclusive producers of an NFL video game.
256
  While this 
article attempts to offset the value of these other rights based on publicly 
available information concerning typical trademark licensing rates for these 
organizations, these estimations introduce further opportunities for 
inaccuracies. 
This is not to say that these estimates provide no value.  While the 
estimates are almost certainly wrong, they are unlikely to have a substantial 
impact.  Even if we think that estimates might be twice or half what the 
true figure is, the estimated rate still provides a minimum and maximum 
bound for the fair market rate for rights of publicity.  Moreover, if and 
when Congress sets about the task of codifying a FCLRRP, interested 
parties would be motivated to correct these estimates if they are grossly 
incorrect.  For example, if in actuality, EA’s sports games retail for an 
average of $55 a unit, this would imply a substantially lower implied 
percentage of gross revenue rate and it might then be motivated to provide 
Congress with that information in the hopes that the default rate would be 
set lower.  In short, these estimates are the start of a discussion, not the end 
of it and, until these estimates are correct, they provide a good-faith 
estimate of what a fair market rate would be and where Congress should 
peg a default price. 
 
i. Estimated NBA 2K14 licensing rate as a percentage of gross revenue. 
 
Take-Two Interactive licenses with the NBA for its NBA 2K series.
257
  
Numbers for the license cost are not publicly available, but according to 
Take-Two’s annual report, the company’s total expenditure for all licenses 
in the 2013 fiscal year (the year NBA 2K14 was produced) was $57.3 
                                                          
255.  Id. 
 
256.  Mike Florio, EA has Exclusive License from NFL for a “Couple More Years”, NBC 
SPORTS (June 20, 2014, 9:54 AM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/06/20/ea-has-
exclusive-license-from-nfl-for-a-couple-more-years/ [http://perma.cc/N5SA-LEPW]. 
257.  Owen S. Good, NBA 2K is Bigger than Madden Because it Paid for Others’ 
Failures, POLYGON (Feb. 15, 2015, 7:24 PM), http://www.polygon.com/2015/2/15/8043147/nba-
2k-is-bigger-than-madden-because-it-paid-for-others-failures [http://perma.cc/REH2-KUEC]. 
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million.
258
  This includes licenses for the company’s discontinued NHL and 
MLB series, liabilities which some estimates put as high as $30 million.
259
  
That said, to avoid basing any estimates on speculation, let us assume for 
the moment that the entire $57.3 million went towards the NBA license, 
realizing that this will mean our estimate will be too high, probably 
substantially so.  To date, NBA 2K14 has sold over 7 million copies.
260
  
959,328 of those copies were sold in the first week of the game’s launch 
(the PS4 and XboxOne releases corresponded with those system’s 
releases).
261
  Assuming all units sold in the first week sold for a retail price 
of $60 and that the remainder of games sold for an average of $45, 
accounting for some full-price sales but also many sales at a deep discount 
as the price fell over time, that means the game has grossed $329.4 million 
to date.  This implies an effective percentage of gross revenue rate of at 
most 17.4% for the bundled right of publicity, trademark, and endorsement 
rights.  Now, consider that the standard royalty rate the NBA charges to 
license their trademarks alone is 13%.
262
  This means that the implied rate 
for the rights of publicity was at most 4.4%, and likely much lower.  This is 
suggestive of a rate comparable to rates ASCAP charges for its licenses. 
 
ii. Estimated Madden NFL 25 licensing rate as a percentage of gross 
revenue. 
 
A credible estimate for the licensing rate charged by the NFL for the 
exclusive right to produce an NFL video game is $50 million per year 
(lump sum).
263
  To date, Madden NFL 25 (the 2014 release in the Madden 
                                                          
258.  Annual Report 2013, supra note 254, at 39.  
 
259.  Good, supra note 257. 
 
260.  Evan Campbell, NBA 2K14 is the Best-Selling Sports Game Ever for Take-Two, IGN 
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.ign.com/articles/2014/08/05/nba-2k14-is-the-best-selling-sports-
game-ever-for-take-two [http://perma.cc/8Q45-GQMH]. 
 
261.  Global Weekly Chart, VGCHARTZ (Mar. 21, 2015), 
http://www.vgchartz.com/weekly/42085/Global/ [http://perma.cc/NX3S-58Q3]. 
262.  Scott Sillcox, Part 8-An Insider’s Guide to the World of Licensed Sports Products: 
Royalty Rates, LICENSED SPORTS (Mar. 1, 2012), 
http://licensedsports.blogspot.com/2012/03/insiders-guide-to-world-of-licensed_2802.html 
[http://perma.cc/E78S-LNBH]. 
 
263.  See John Gaudiosi, Madden: The $4 Billion Video Game Franchise, CNN MONEY 
(Sept. 5, 2013, 11:51 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/05/technology/innovation/madden-25/ 
[http://perma.cc/W9XK-J5DG]. 
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series) sold 5.14 million units worldwide.
264
  The release price for the game 
was $59.99.
265
  For an AAA title, initial sales were slow, only moving a 
million units in the first week.
266
  Assuming the initial million all sold for 
$60 but the remainder sold for an average price of $45, factoring in some 
sales at sticker price but also many well below it as the price dropped over 
the year, that places total gross revenue for the game at $246.3 million.  
This means that the effective percentage of gross revenue rate paid to the 
NFL was 20.3%.  Unlike the NBA, the NFL does not have a publicly 
available standard licensing royalty rate.  But if we assume it is comparable 
to the NBA’s, as well as the NHL’s and MLB’s, which are 12%, that means 
that after discounting the implicit rate for the trademarks, EA paid the NFL 
7.3% of the game’s gross revenue for the rights of publicity of its players 
and the exclusivity right.  Ignoring the exclusivity premium entirely, this 
suggests a rate comparable to the implicit rate charged for mechanical 
rights under 37 C.F.R. § 385.12. 
 
iii. Estimated Hart and Keller settlement agreement rate as a percentage of 
gross revenue. 
 
Using a settlement agreement to determine the effective royalty rate 
carries with it a host of challenges, even exceeding those for the Madden 
and NBA 2K14 licenses.  Class action settlements are reached amongst a 
storm of considerations, including the uncertainty and expense of trial, the 
risk aversion of the class counsel and the defendant firm, and the lost time-
value of money that would result from a protracted trial and appeals 
process.
267
  Still, most of these concerns cut both ways, encouraging both 
parties to reach an agreement.  It would be wrong to suggest that a class 
action settlement necessarily favors either party, although there is certainly 
                                                          
264.  Global Sales Per Game: Madden NFL 25, VGCHARTZ,  
http://www.vgchartz.com/gamedb/?name=Madden+NFL+25&publisher=&platform=&genre=&
minSales=0&results=200 (last visited Sept. 17, 2016). 
 
265.  Madden NFL 25, GAMESTOP, http://www.gamestop.com/ps4/games/madden-nfl-
25/109948 [http://perma.cc/JT7Q-LDAR]. 
 
266.  Erik Kain, ‘Madden NFL 25’ Sales Down Over Last Year, First Week Still Tops 1M 
Units, FORBES (Sept. 5, 2013, 8:46 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2013/09/05/madden-nfl-25-down-over-last-year-still-top-
1m-units-first-week/#48ec06b47536 [http://perma.cc/TCG6-Y689]. 
 
267.  See Brian W. Warwick, Note, Class Action Settlement Collusion: Let’s Not Sue 
Class Counsel Quite Yet . . . ., 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 605, 606 (1999). 
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some public sentiment that they favor defendants and class counsel over 
actual victims.
268
  Moreover, while the NCAA class action settlement 
agreement may seem a less accurate figure because of the additional 
distorting motivations for reaching that figure, it also provides a direct 
comparison.  While the rates charged by professional athletic organizations 
draw a good parallel to that which might be charged by amateur—but 
nevertheless famous—athletes, the rate actually paid by them is even 
better.  This is particularly true because the settlement covers only rights of 
publicity, unlike the above agreements which also cover trademark and 
endorsement rights. 
The approved settlement agreement in Keller and Hart (covering both 
actions) obligates EA to establish a $40 million settlement fund.
269
  This 
fund covers “[a]ny NCAA Division I football and men’s basketball player 
who was listed on a roster published or issued by a school whose team was 
included in a NCAA Branded Videogame originally published or 
distributed from July 21, 2005 through September 3, 2014.”
270
  EA released 
42 titles simulating either NCAA football or basketball during that time 
period.
271
  These forty-two titles sold a total of 24.04 million units 
                                                          
268.  See id. (“‘Collusion’ in the settlement of class action lawsuits refers to action taken 
by lawyers representing a class to the detriment of the class members, but for the benefit of the 
attorneys.  Recently, numerous magazines and newspapers across the country have been quick to 
add fuel to the fire raging against such abusive practices, particularly when settlements are 
involved.”).  
 
269.  Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement with Defendant 
Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 
270.  Id. 
 
271.  See Electronic Arts, IGN, http://www.ign.com/companies/electronic-arts 
[http://perma.cc/2TA7-SDL4].  The titles, listed in descending order of sales, are: NCAA Football 
06 (PS2), NCAA Football 07 (PS2), NCAA Football 13 (X360), NCAA Football 14 (X360), 
NCAA Football 12 (X360), NCAA Football 06 (XB), NCAA Football 10 (X360), NCAA 
Football 11 (X360), NCAA Football 13 (PS3), NCAA Football 11 (PS3), NCAA Football 10 
(PS3), NCAA Football 12 (PS3), NCAA Football 08 (PS2), NCAA Football 14 (PS3), NCAA 
Football 07 (X360), NCAA Football 09 (X360), NCAA Football 08 (X360), NCAA Football 09 
(PS3), NCAA Football 10 (PS2), NCAA March Madness 07 (PS2), NCAA Football 07XB, 
NCAA March Madness 06 (PS2), NCAA Football 09 (PS2), NCAA Football 2004 (XB), NCAA 
Football 11 (PS2), NCAA Football 08 (PS3), NCAA Football 07 (PSP), NCAA Basketball 10 
(PS3), NCAA Basketball 10 (X360), NCAA Basketball 09 (PS2), NCAA March Madness 08 
(PS2), NCAA Football 09 (PSP), NCAA Basketball 09 (X360), NCAA March Madness 06 (XB), 
NCAA March Madness 08 (X360), NCAA Football 10 (PSP), NCAA March Madness 07 (X360), 
NCAA Football 09 All-Play (Wii), NCAA Basketball 09 (PS3), NCAA March Madness 08 
(PS3), NCAA Football 08 (XB), and NCAA Basketball 09: March Madness Edition (X360). 
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globally.
272
  Release prices for AAA games on major consoles have 
remained relatively constant at $60 over the time period of the settlement, 
although like more modern games, the price for all these titles dropped over 
time.
273
  For this reason, this article assumes an average retail sale price per 
unit of $45, which is consistent with the estimated price used for the 
Madden NFL 25 and NBA 2K14 estimations.  This estimate puts total gross 
revenue for the combined sale of these titles at $1.082 billion and implies a 
right of publicity royalty rate of 3.7% of gross revenue.  This also suggests 
a fair market rate above that charged by Performing Rights Organizations 
but still below the regulatory rates for mechanical rights.  It is also 
comparable to any plausible estimate of the implied rate charged by the 
NBA for the NBA 2K series. 
 
c. Considerations of equity in setting a default rate. 
 
Comparisons to existing rates in other compulsory licensing regimes 
and in observed market transactions should be the principal guide for 
setting a default rate.  Doing so avoids both favoritism and arbitrariness.  
The fair market value is, if nothing else, fair.  That said, it is worth 
mentioning a few equitable considerations.  First, setting any rate and 
creating an associated FCLRRP leaves athletes and other figures better off 
than they were before.  Under the current system, no matter how it is 
interpreted, they will get nothing going forward.  On the other hand, the 
developers of these creative works have at least a plausible argument that 
they are entitled on First Amendment grounds to produce the work without 
seeking a license from anyone.  If this is the case, any system leaves the 
developers worse off.  For this reason, there is less concern from an 
equitable perspective about erring in favor of the developers than there is 
about erring in favor of the rights holders when setting a rate. 
Second, the right of publicity is a fundamentally less important right 
than copyright, which is what all comparable compulsory licenses govern.  
Without a right of publicity, our society would still have NCAA athletes, 
                                                          
272.  Game Database: Global Sales of NCAA Games, VGCHARTZ, 
http://www.vgchartz.com/gamedb/?name=NCAA [http://perma.cc/U2JX-ZQEU]. 
 
273.  All but two of the forty-two titles were released on a major console and the two 
releases on other platforms (the handheld PSP) also released for $60.00.  In fact, the PSP games 
still command a high price years later with NCAA Football 2010 for the PSP selling for $47.95 
on Amazon.  See NCAA Football 10-Sony PSP, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/NCAA-
Football-10-Sony-PSP/dp/B001S86IRM [http://perma.cc/F69X-MMBC]. 
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politicians, and pop stars.  Indeed, our country functioned until 1953 
without such a right
274
 and to this day, twenty-one states do not recognize 
the claim.
275
  It is a right that, while perhaps desirable, is not necessary.  On 
the other hand, without a functional copyright system, we would have 
drastically fewer novels, films, shows, and video games.  It is a right that 
the United States Constitution explicitly empowers Congress to enforce.
276
  
Seen from this perspective, ensuring that copyright holders receive 
sufficient compensation under compulsory regimes is a task of vital 
importance in promoting the continued production of creative works in this 
country.  Thus, it stands to reason that society, and the Copyright Royalty 
Board specifically, would be comfortable setting and approving higher 
royalty rates for copyrights than they would for rights of publicity. 
Third, while the digital age has seen remarkable innovations in the 
manner and quality in which music is transmitted, those who license 
musical works are still fundamentally serving as a middleman, delivering 
music from creators to listeners virtually unaltered.  Without music, 
services like Pandora and Spotify simply could not exist.  Video game 
developers, on the other hand, use the likenesses of real persons as just part 
of the content on which their creative works draw.  Without their 
considerable talent and creativity, any production depicting real persons 
would, at best, be characterized as a fact book.  But while a game that 
simulated a sport might be less appealing if it used randomly generated or 
fictional players, it would still be a work of value to some consumers.  As 
Judge Bybee notes in his dissent in the case In re NCAA Student-Athlete 
Name and Likeness Licensing Litigation, even in the NCAA Football 
series, there are enjoyable aspects of the game based entirely on fiction.
277
  
While a player can control teams based on the team’s real-world 
counterparts, users can also “enter[] ‘Dynasty’ mode, where the user . . . 
recruits players from a randomly generated pool of high school athletes, or 
‘Campus Legend’ mode, where the user controls a virtual player from high 
school through college, making choices relating to practices, academics, 
                                                          
274.  See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d 
Cir. 1953). 
 
275.  See generally THOMAS PHILLIP BOGGESS V, CAUSES OF ACTION FOR AN 
INFRINGEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY (2016). 
 
276.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
 
277.  See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 
1271–72 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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and social life.”
278
  Because developers take on the role of shaping rather 
than merely transmitting content, and because their works could exist 
outside the use of any person’s likeness, on the balance, it would seem that 
relative to copyright holders, those who hold a right of publicity should be 
compensated proportionately less for the compulsory use of these rights. 
Fourth, requiring a license for the use of a person’s likeness creates a 
chilling effect on speech.  The Supreme Court has unequivocally ruled that 
video games, like all forms of literature, are protected speech under the 
First Amendment.
279
  The higher the required payment, the more that 
speech is suppressed.  For this reason, this article joins other scholars in 
advocating that the requirement payment be reduced accordingly.  In “The 
Price of Celebrity: Valuing the Right of Publicity in Calculating 
Compensatory Damages,” Matthew Savare argues that ideally, works of 
entertainment should have First Amendment protection from rights of 
publicity claims, but that even if we do not provide them this protection 
outright, courts should at least discount damage calculations by the 
“percentage of the questionable speech that is transformative.”
280
  Because 
the works covered by a FCLRRP will likely be wide-ranging, a default rate 
would not be able to incorporate a precise percentage reduction, if one 
could be calculated for an individual work at all.  But this does not mean 
free speech considerations should be cast aside.  At the very least, any 
default rate that would meaningfully deter a substantial amount of speech 
should be strongly suspect. 
All of these equitable considerations suggest that those who possess 
rights of publicity should receive less compensation than the above 
comparisons otherwise suggest. 
 
d. All of the above suggest that a default rate of 5% would appropriately 
compensate rights holders for the use of their likeness within a 
nontransformative creative work. 
 
Five percent is a reasonable default rate.  As shown above, reasonable 
comparisons, both from other compulsory regimes and from the market, 
suggest an effective rate of between 1.7% and 10.5%.  A rate of 5% sets the 
                                                          
278.  Id. 
 
279.  Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 786 (2011). 
 
280.  Matthew Savare, Comment, The Price of Celebrity: Valuing the Right of Publicity in 
Calculating Compensatory Damages, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 129, 185 (2004). 
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rate at a level that is both within the range seen in compulsory licensing 
regimes and between the estimated rate paid to the NBA and the NFL.  
Because the estimates for these real-world royalty rates are both very likely 
overestimates (because of the licensing price overestimate for the NBA 
license and the exclusivity agreement tied into the NFL license), a rate of 
5% is probably even on the high end when compared to the best available 
real world comparisons.  It is also higher than the implicit rate generated by 
the Hart and Keller settlement.  Still, given the ability of both rights 
holders and developers to negotiate more appropriate (perhaps lower) rates 
when a qualified rights aggregator can be established, the 5% figure 
provides a workable baseline that will allow both developers to create 
works and rights holders to be compensated in the event fair market 
negotiations are not possible. 
 
F. Distribution Structure 
 
This article’s proposed FCLRRP separates the creation of a 
distribution structure from the rate of payments.  Whereas the rate of 
payments concerns how much money is contributed to the pool of funds, 
the distribution structure concerns how players will be compensated from 
that pool.  Unlike for the rate of compensation, where this article proposes 
no court involvement or oversight—with rates either set by statute or 
negotiated independently with qualified rights aggregators—issues of 
distribution simply should not be left to such inflexible devices.  The 
creative works conceivably covered by this regime are wide ranging.  Even 
just considering our current conception of video games, it could cover 
simulations of sporting events, military battles, political campaigns, and the 
daily lives of the Hollywood elite.
281
  It would be foolhardy to create a 
single distribution regime by statute or regulation for all these diverse 
situations if we want to fairly compensate each right holder commensurate 
with the contribution that the right holder actually made to the game or 
other work. 
                                                          
281.  Examples of video games that already wade into this area (whether or not they yet 
use the precise likenesses of real people) are the “NCAA Football” series, the “Close Combat” 
series, “President Forever 2016,” and “Kim Kardashian: Hollywood.”  NCAA FOOTBALL SERIES 
(EA Sports, PlayStation 3/Xbox 360 CD-ROM 2014); CLOSE COMBAT (Microsoft, Mac/Win. 
CD-ROM 1996); PRESIDENT FOREVER 2016 (270soft, Mac/Win. Dwnld. 2016) (path: 
http://270soft.com/us-election-games/president-election-game-2016/> Get it Now!> President 
Infinity>Buy Now); KIM KARDASHIAN: HOLLYWOOD (Glu Mobile, Web 
browser/Mac/iOS/Android Dwnld. 2014). 
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Moreover, doing so would ignore the vast array of individual metrics 
that may be available for a given work.  Most titles with online multiplayer 
capability—that is, most big releases—keep detailed metrics on player 
activity.
282
  It is often possible to track play-time, team selection, 
customization rates, win percentages, etcetera.
283
  Built with creating a 
compensation structure in mind, these games could keep even more 
detailed statistics that could be used to create a distribution based on the 
actual, rather than purely theoretical, value that an individual’s likeness 
contributed to the game.  Any statutory or regulatory system would have to 
appeal to the lowest common denominator of data available for any work.  
Instead, it is better to have a system comparable to that found in the 
compulsory regime for cable television retransmission rights or in class 
action settlement agreements, where payments can be made in accordance 
with the nature of the underlying rights holders and the available 
information. 
For the above reasons, and more discussed in detail below, this article 
proposes that the distribution regime be governed as follows: once the pool 
of collected royalties reaches a certain monetary value, the game developer 
will propose a committee of experts.  After a period for comment by rights 
holders, the Copyright Royalty Board will approve or reject the proposed 
committee.  Once a committee is approved, the committee will set a 
distribution regime in accordance with guiding principles meant to ensure a 
fair and equitable distribution for rights holders.  This proposed distribution 
structure will be publicly filed and, after a period for comment by rights 
holders, will be approved or rejected by the Copyright Royalty Board.  
Once a distribution structure is approved, it will be administered in 
accordance with its terms. 
 
1. Need for a monetary trigger prior to appointment of the committee and 
distribution of the fund. 
 
Creating a distribution regime that fairly compensates rights holders 
and administering that regime will carry costs, including the public expense 
of court time.  It is only sensible to go about a task when the benefits 
outweigh the costs.  Many creative works opting into this licensing regime 
                                                          
282.  See Extra Credits, Extra Credits: Metrics, YOUTUBE (May 10, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nqGcXOksFGg [http://perma.cc/FTQ4-C5NA]. 
 
283.  Id. 
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will ultimately generate trivial or nonexistent royalty funds from which 
rights holders can draw.  Requiring that a distribution regime be set only 
after the fund is of a sufficient size helps ensure that the process is cost-
justified.  This process is already used by existing compulsory licensing 
regimes.
284
  For example, SoundExchange will delay, or withhold entirely, 
payments to artists and publishers that do not meet certain specified 
thresholds.
285
  A FCLRRP would be justified in doing the same. 
This article proposes a minimum threshold to trigger committee 
appointment of $200 per likeness depicted in the work or $200,000 total, 
for works depicting over 1,000 likenesses, adjusted annually for inflation.  
This is substantially above the minimum payout level of $10.00 that 
SoundExchange requires for a distribution (although below the $250.00 
level in which SoundExchange delays payments).
286
  And while it is above 
ASCAP’s minimum payment thresholds, which are set at either $1.00 or 
$100.00 depending on whether artists opt for electronic or physical 
payment respectively, ASCAP requires members to pay a $50.00 fee to 
even register, effectively imposing a minimum lifetime earnings of $50 
prior to distribution.
287
  But unlike a work licensed under the FCLRRP, 
SoundExchange and ASCAP already have a structure and system for 
distribution in place.  In contrast, a committee appointed by the FCLRRP 
would not only need to distribute funds, but also design and implement the 
infrastructure for such a distribution.  While SoundExchange and ASCAP 
both have much lower minimum payments, their total revenue volume is 
far in excess of the $200,000.00 figure, allowing them to recoup the cost of 
designing and implementing a distribution system.
288
  Requiring a $200 per 
                                                          
284.  See General FAQ, supra note 248.  
 
285.  See id. (“SoundExchange offers a monthly royalty payment program for 1) those that 
are signed up to receive electronic payments, 2) and have royalties due of at least $250.  Artists 
and labels that do not meet the minimum monthly threshold will continue to be paid on our 
regular, quarterly schedule (March, June, September, and December) under the organization’s 
existing guidelines.  To receive a quarterly payment, you must have accrued at least $10 ($100 for 
a paper check) in royalties before a scheduled distribution.  If you are under the threshold, 
SoundExchange will hold your royalties until you accrue enough royalties.”). 
 
286.  Id. 
 
287.  See Join ASCAP, ASCAP (2015), http://www.ascap.com/join/ 
[http://perma.cc/YJF3-NQF2]. 
 
288.  In 2014, SoundExchange collected $774 million in fees.  See Working With 
SoundExchange, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/SX-Infographic_as-of-2.13.151.jpg [http://perma.cc/7UMR-V39Z]. 
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likeness minimum makes it more likely that any applicable fund will not be 
entirely consumed by administrative expenses and will result in actual, 
substantive payments to rights holders. 
Moreover, in both compulsory licensing regimes and other areas of 
law, there are monetary minimums which demonstrate a preference for 
dealing with claims of meaningful value.  While SoundExchange will 
distribute payments to rights holders once they reach the $10.00 threshold, 
an entity can only acquire the rights to SoundExchange’s catalog for a 
minimum payment of $500.00.
289
  Similarly, while ASCAP rates vary by 
the size and type of entity, the lowest advertised price on their website is 
$365.00 a year (for individually owned cafés with occupancy under 50 
persons).
290
  The law modifies or limits rights in other areas based on the 
financial interest at stake, often with minimum thresholds far above those 
suggested for a FCLRRP.  For example, to obtain diversity jurisdiction, the 
amount in controversy must be over $75,000.00
291
 and to qualify under the 
Class Action Fairness Act, a class’s total claim must exceed 
$5,000,000.00.
292
  In light of these figures, requiring a fund size of $200.00 
per class member or $200,000.00 total is reasonable to ensure the system is 
both efficient and generates meaningful returns to rights holders. 
 
2. Committee composition. 
 
The approved final committee will need to be composed of 
individuals who are capable of designing an effective, fair, and equitable 
distribution regime.  Just as the nature of the works opting into a FCLRRP 
will differ, so too will the distribution committee, who will represent an 
array of skills and talents.  However, this article identifies three skill sets 
that will be necessary for any committee to possess if it is to effectively 
design and administer a distribution structure: a person who is intimately 
                                                          
289.  See Commercial Webcaster 2016 Rates, supra note 250.  
 
290.  Get an ASCAP Music License Restaurants, Bars & Grills, ASCAP (2015), 
http://www.ascap.com/licensing/types/restaurant-bar-grill-tavern/restaurant-bar-grill-tavern-
individual/restaurant-bar-grill-tavern-individual-a.aspx [http://perma.cc/PY3Z-PAJH]. 
 
291.  28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2011). 
 
292.  See generally Jared R. Friedmann et al., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA): 
Overview, THOMSON REUTERS: PRACTICAL LAW 1, 
http://www.cozen.com/Templates/media/files/ClassActionFairnessActof2005CAFA.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/3LFU-MFQA]. 
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familiar with the work, statistics, and other metrics kept regarding it, a 
person intimately familiar with the industry or activity in which the 
depicted persons gained their notoriety, and a person familiar with the legal 
rules surrounding compulsory licensing regimes and the FCLRRP in 
particular.  Additionally, this article outlines sensible requirements for 
ensuring the committee maintains impartiality. 
 
a. The need for a committee member who is intimately familiar with the 
work, statistics, and other metrics. 
 
One of the primary advantages of individually designing distribution 
regimes for each work is that the regimes can use the full range of data 
available from a given work to ensure the distribution is as fair and 
efficient as possible.  Without knowledge of the metrics available, 
however, a committee can do nothing but resort to the basic and imprecise 
metrics seen in the Keller settlement agreement.
293
  The requirement that 
the developer appoint a member who has this familiarity and knowledge 
will allow the committee to carry out its purpose.  In theory, this could also 
be accomplished by having the developer provide a comprehensive list and 
guide for the metrics kept which would aid the committee.  However, doing 
so introduces the risk that the list is tailored to indicate preferred 
distributions (i.e., to rights holders with whom the developer has other 
business relationships).  It would also introduce the possibility of undue 
delay as the committee may ask for clarification and interpretation.  Or 
worse, a proposed regime might be impossible to implement due to a 
misinterpretation regarding the metrics available to the committee.  
Requiring the appointment of a member with this knowledge substantially 
reduces these risks and ensures that if the final distribution structure is 
unfair or inefficient, it is not because of a lack of knowledge of the 
statistical capabilities available to the committee. 
A developer will also be required to tender any data it gathers from 
users of the licensed work if the committee ultimately deems it necessary to 
generate the fairest and most efficient distribution possible.  If deemed 
appropriate by the Copyright Royalty Board, the actual data may be kept 
under seal to protect trade secrets or confidential business information.  
The nature of the data used and how it is used in calculating each right 
holder’s share of the royalty pool will have to be public so that meaningful 
                                                          
293.  Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement with Defendant 
Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 
ELR – Bucher (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2017  5:09 PM 
128 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1 
 
comments can be made prior to the Copyright Royalty Board approving the 
distribution structure. 
 
b. The need for a person intimately familiar with the industry or activity in 
which the depicted persons gained their notoriety. 
 
The right of publicity seeks to ensure compensation for individuals 
when others use their likeness to harness their notoriety.
294
  It protects 
against misappropriation of a person’s likeness so the person may receive 
commercial value for it.
295
  To a large extent, the committee will implicitly 
or explicitly set about the task of determining the commercial value of 
individual likenesses relative to one another, which as noted above, is no 
easy task.  To do this in a nonarbitrary way, it is important that the 
committee understand how the individuals depicted acquire and maintain 
their fame and what draws consumers to some likenesses over others.  As 
large, comprehensive data sets on user activity continue to grow, the 
importance of this aspect will grow less important as measurements of 
actual desirability replace theoretical ones.  But the committee will 
ultimately have to make subjective judgments.  For example, committees 
will have to judge questions such as these: “How much does having an 
historically accurate second string contribute to the consumer’s enjoyment 
relative to just having the starting players be accurate?” or “In a political 
campaign simulator where many players run Barack Obama’s campaign, 
what is the value of being able to face his historically accurate opponents, 
John McCain and Mitt Romney, rather than randomly generated, fictional 
political opponents?”  Without at least one member of the committee who 
understands the underlying workings of the industry or activity in which 
the depicted individuals engage, these judgments are less likely to reflect 
the realities of the likeness’s publicity, and consequently, the fairness of the 
distribution regime is jeopardized. 
 
c. The need for a person familiar with the legal rules surrounding 
compulsory licensing regimes, and the FCLRRP in particular. 
 
As a legally mandated body subject to oversight and approval by the 
Copyright Royalty Board, the committee will need to understand both the 
                                                          
294.  BOGGESS, supra note 275, at 84. 
 
295.  Id. 
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practical realities and options before it and its legal duties and obligations.  
As case law develops over time, this role will grow in importance.  To 
ensure that the committee fully understands its duties and to ensure that any 
proposal is unlikely to violate the statutory or common law requirements of 
the FCLRRP, a member of the committee should be familiar with the 
functioning of compulsory licensing in the United States and the 
functioning of the FCLRRP in particular.  Having such a person will also 
foster communication between the Copyright Royalty Board and the 
committee in the event the initial distribution proposal is rejected or 
questioned. 
 
d. General requirements for committee member appointment to ensure 
impartiality. 
 
If the distribution of collected royalties is to be fair, it is important 
that the committee members be impartial.  To facilitate this, this article 
proposes two additional requirements in respect to an appointment: (1) no 
committee member or their immediate family shall have any pecuniary 
interest in the distribution; and (2) that less than half of the committee be 
composed of employees of the developer. 
 
 
 
 
i. No committee member or their immediate family shall have any 
pecuniary interest in the distribution. 
 
This limitation is fairly common sense.  If members have a direct 
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the distribution—for example, if they 
are rights holders—this may influence how they structure the distribution.  
Namely, such members will want to afford themselves favorable treatment.  
In the case of a FCLRRP, this also means that those employed by an 
organization that holds rights of publicity used in work cannot serve on the 
committee; otherwise, they might be motivated to direct a disproportionate 
distribution towards the set of rights held by their company.  It is especially 
important that representatives of organizations that license other 
intellectual property (“IP”) rights be excluded from the committee.  Since 
developers pay for other IP rights, but are not financially impacted by the 
distribution scheme, there is an obvious opportunity for collusion where the 
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holder of multiple IP rights grants a lower price on the nonpublicity rights 
in exchange for favorable treatment in regard to distribution, resulting in 
increased profits for the developer and certain rights holder at the expense 
of other rights holders.  Even without an explicit quid pro quo, there would 
be a strong incentive for any employees of the developer to cede to their 
business partner’s wishes in the distribution phase.  Preventing 
stakeholders or their agents from serving on the committee reduces the 
likelihood of such self-interested behavior. 
 
ii. Less than half of the committee shall be composed of employees of the 
developer. 
 
As explained above, there is a natural opportunity for those with 
existing business relationships with developers to collude at the distribution 
stage of the FCLRRP.  Even if there is no stakeholder who engages in other 
transactions with the licensee, the distribution should reflect a theoretical 
fair market, not the whims of the developer.  For this reason, a majority of 
the committee should be independent third parties rather than current or 
recent employees of the developer.  Employees of the developers should 
not be excluded entirely—they likely hold valuable information as to the 
metrics available to the committee and may also provide insight into the 
developer’s customer base.  Mandating that third parties comprise a 
majority of the committee means that developers will not be able to force 
their wishes on rights holders without convincing independent entities that 
the proposed distribution is fair and equitable. 
 
3. Committee compensation and administration expenses. 
 
Committee members will need to be paid a reasonable wage and there 
will likely be other expenses associated with distributing compensation to 
rights holders.  When the Copyright Royalty Board considers a proposed 
distribution committee, it will consider the proposed compensation for the 
proposed members as part of that determination. While the Copyright 
Royalty Board can serve as a check on the reasonableness of any fees 
charged, a FCLRRP should lay out who will bear these expenses.  How 
these expenses are allocated influences the incentives of both the developer 
(in respect to who is appointed and how well the committee is paid), and 
the rights holders (in regard to their expressed preferences in the form of 
comments and challenges at the approval stages).  To best align these 
incentives with the goal of creating a fair and efficient system, this article 
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proposes that administrative costs be taken out of the fund directly, that the 
salaries for any committee members who are current or recent employees 
be borne by the developer, and that compensation for third-party committee 
members be borne primarily by the royalty fund with partial payments from 
the developer at high salary ranges. 
 
a. Administrative expenses borne by the royalty fund. 
 
Increasing precision increases cost.  One of the issues a committee 
will have to grapple with is how to fairly distribute royalties to rights 
holders while also ensuring that the administration of that distribution does 
not swallow most, or all, of the fund, resulting in low compensation for 
members in real terms.  If the developer bore the administration cost even 
in part, rights holders would be incentivized to demand a higher level of 
precision in determining distribution amounts than might be cost-justified.  
By taking these expenses out of the fund, as SoundExchange does in 
distributing royalties to its rights holders,
296
 rights holders will need to 
balance the desire for a comprehensive distribution structure with the desire 
to limit administrative expenses.  Further, there is little reason to think that 
the committee, even those employed by the developer, would have an 
interest in seeing the fund go to administrative expenses rather than rights 
holders.  If anything, they would seek to generate goodwill with rights 
holders, which would incentivize them to reduce these costs.  For these 
reasons, the cost of administering the distribution will be borne by the fund. 
 
b. Committee members who are current or recent employees of the 
developer will be compensated by the developer. 
 
If employees of the developer are compensated by the fund even in 
part, there would be an incentive for the developer to pay them a high 
salary, rewarding them for past and future service without bearing the full 
cost of that compensation.  Moreover, the FCLRRP is designed to transfer 
funds from developers to rights holders in exchange for the value that the 
rights holders generate.  If developers could then recover that money by 
appointing their employees to the committee, it would create the perception 
that that purpose was being thwarted.  This must be weighed against the 
risk that developers will be reluctant to nominate qualified employees for 
the committee if they bear the full cost since the developer receives no 
                                                          
296.  17 U.S.C. § 114 (2010). 
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direct benefit from appointing a competent committee member.  This 
incentive is somewhat cabined by the fact that they are obligated, as a 
condition of opting into the FCLRRP, to provide at least one committee 
member with intimate knowledge of the creative work. 
Additionally, because the developer still bears a portion of the 
expenses for third-party committee members,
297
 there will be instances in 
which the developer will choose to appoint an employee when doing so is 
vastly more cost-efficient than a third-party alternative.  For example, a 
developer would still prefer to appoint in-house counsel familiar with 
compulsory licensing regimes who was paid $50 an hour over a lawyer 
from a large law firm who was familiar with the same but charges $600 an 
hour.  Given the above concerns with direct payment of developer 
employees, any committee member who is a current or recent employee of 
the developer shall be compensated entirely by the developer. 
 
c. Committee members who are not current or recent employees of the 
developer will be compensated by the royalty fund up to a reasonable cap, 
after which the developer will compensate them. 
 
Aligning the incentives for the payment of third-party committee 
members is a difficult task.  On the one hand, if the developer bears the 
entire cost or even part of it, he or she will appoint the cheapest individuals 
to serve on the committee.  Because the fund is only distributed to rights 
holders, the developer has no direct interest in ensuring that a distribution 
plan is fair or efficient and, in turn, no incentive to ensure the committee 
members are effective and competent.  On the other hand, if the fund bears 
the entire cost, developers may appoint overqualified individuals or appoint 
members based on nepotistic considerations.  While the Copyright Royalty 
Board can serve as a check against the appointment of overqualified or 
simply overpriced committee members, ideally the cost structure would 
also motivate the developer to make appropriate appointments.  Based on 
these considerations, the full cost of third-party committee members will be 
deducted from the royalty fund up to 2% of the fund’s value, thereby 
eliminating the incentive for a developer to select only the most cost 
effective members.  To the extent total compensation exceeds 2% of the 
fund’s total value, the fund will bear 90% of the cost and the developer will 
bear 10%, creating an upward bound check on the cost of committee 
members without eviscerating the incentive for developers to appoint well-
                                                          
297.  See infra Section V.F.4.a–b. 
ELR – Bucher (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2017  5:09 PM 
2016] PLAYING AROUND HART AND KELLER’S FULL-COURT PRESS 133 
 
qualified individuals to ensure a fair and efficient distribution regime will 
be created. 
 
4. Guiding principles for constructing a distribution structure. 
 
While the hallmark of the FCLRRP’s distribution structure is 
flexibility, allowing the regime to apply to the full range of creative works 
currently in existence and yet to come, the committee will need guidance in 
designing an effective regime.  One might think of dozens of principles that 
could be codified in a FCLRRP to help guide the committee.  Or one might 
favor no legislative directive in this regard, allowing instead for a robust 
case law to develop over time and serve that function.  This article neither 
advocates a particular position on how these principles will be best enacted 
nor outlines a complete list of what those principles should be.  This 
section does, however, suggest some concepts that might reasonably serve 
as a starting place for committees faced with the task of developing a 
distribution structure. 
 
a. The committee should favor distribution based on demonstrated value 
rather than theoretical calculations of a likeness’s worth. 
 
The amount of data collected by modern day developers on the use of 
their games is mind-boggling.  For example, a multiplayer first-person 
shooter will track the number of games played, number of games won, how 
often and for how long players use given weapons, characters, special 
abilities and other games features, whether a player uses an audio headset, 
whether, how, and how often he or she communicates with other players, 
whether and how often he or she mutes other players, who he or she plays 
with and for how long, etcetera.
298
  In other areas of law and in academia, a 
resort to theoretical or derivative models is the first and only resort.  But 
this need not be the case under a FCLRRP.  The value of a given depiction 
can be very closely approximated or determined by the actual consumer 
experience.  Persons whose avatars are played more can be compensated 
more.  This does not remove subjective calculations.  For example, the 
committee will still need to decide relative valuation questions.  For 
example, how to value the avatars the player selects to play versus the 
avatars he seeks to play against versus the avatars and likenesses that are 
incidentally or randomly presented.  But this data does mean guesswork 
                                                          
298.  See Extra Credits, supra note 282. 
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can be largely eliminated. 
 
b. The committee should favor the establishment of a fixed distribution 
ratio after the qualified creative work has been released for a year. 
 
The wide availability of precise and massive data on player usage 
might tempt a committee to fluctuate the distribution over time as use 
fluctuates.  It might seem sensible to distribute any revenues with current 
usage similar to the music industry model.  The problem is, unlike in the 
music industry, fees are not collected by use but rather as a percentage of 
gross revenue for the qualified creative work.  For works using a traditional 
AAA video game revenue generation model, the revenue will be very 
frontloaded and may also spike as additional downloadable content is 
released.  Under a current usage model, revenue would be distributed 
disproportionately to those people whose likeness is used early on by 
purchasers or otherwise used in the months that revenue spikes occurred. 
This process will not only inaccurately depict the value the player 
gets from the array of depicted likenesses, it will favor established, known 
persons.  A new player may select a famous team or player to start his 
game.  Later, in an effort to up the challenge of the game or simply explore 
the work more deeply, the player may start selecting lesser-known avatars.  
The ability to replay the game over and over as novel characters was part of 
the value captured in the initial purchase price, but may not be 
demonstrated until months later.  Thus, the committee should not pursue 
distribution until an adequate sample of consumer usage data can be 
captured. 
Of course, if the committee waited until the full life-cycle of the game 
expired, a process that could take a decade or more, the rights holders 
would be denied timely and relevant distributions.  Further, while the data 
available to developers today is unfathomably large, its collection has a 
cost.  Often, this cost is very low, but if a distribution structure mandates 
payments based on this data, the developer would need to continue to 
collect the data, perhaps for long after it was profitable for the company to 
do so.  Both of these concerns suggest that there needs to be a timely end 
date to the collection of metrics for distributions. 
This article suggests that this time period be a year from the games 
release, at which point additional distributions from additional revenue (if 
any) will be made in the same proportion as the original distribution.  This 
provides enough time to gather data on player usage over a substantial 
period of play without burdening the developer with a long time period to 
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guarantee metric collection.  A year should also be long enough for the 
committee to structure the system in the event there is protracted debate or 
comments in opposition to the proposed distribution plan.  There is nothing 
that necessitates a year over any other viable time frame, but it seems a 
sensible time horizon for a committee to aim for, balancing both the 
interest in collecting a complete and representative data set and the interest 
of distributing the funds in a timely manner. 
 
c. The committee need not locate every rights holder, but for those not 
located, his or her distribution should be held for a substantial period of 
time in case he or she emerges to claim it. 
 
Because administrative expenses will be borne entirely by the fund, 
expenses associated with locating and notifying rights holders will 
necessarily mean a lower total distribution to the group.  While class action 
jurisprudence favors delivering actual notice to all potential claimants and, 
barring that, providing constructive notice through publication, this article 
eschews those preferences in the FCLRRP context.  Instead, distributions 
should be made automatically to any rights holder for whom sufficient 
information is available and when that information is unavailable, the 
establishment of a website allowing depicted persons to register and claim 
their funds should be sufficient. 
When sufficient information is available, distributions should be 
made without requiring registration or notice to individual rights holders.  
Often, this information is available.  As game series develop, many of the 
persons depicted will likely remain the same year to year and the previous 
information acquired for the distribution of funds can be used again.  While 
the developer is unlikely to have all the necessary information, there is no 
sound reason that it needs all of this information for the system to operate 
effectively.  Payments that can be made should be made. 
For those rights holders who cannot have a payment automatically 
transferred to them because of a lack of information, a claims website 
where the rights holders can register and receive electronic payments 
should be established.  Both ASCAP and SoundExchange require 
registration from their members and require providing the information 
required for electronic transfer to take advantage of a lower minimum 
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threshold for distribution.
299
  When necessary to pay administrative costs, 
these organizations may even appropriate funds from old, unclaimed 
accounts, essentially causing an artist who is not proactive in registering to 
forfeit compensation.
300
 
Many areas of law favor those who actively monitor and enforce their 
rights.  This preference is demonstrated in the availability of statutes of 
limitations and laches defenses.
301
  While the precise nature of the right of 
publicity varies from state to state, both statutes of limitations and laches 
defenses have been applied to right of publicity claims in some states.
302
  
These defenses are also found in the commensurate intellectual property 
rights of copyright and trademarks.
303
  Given the preference for the 
affirmative assertion of rights of publicity and comparable intellectual 
property rights under compulsory licensing regimes, committees should not 
prioritize outreach to rights holders. 
This is not to say the claims of those who do not register quickly 
should be entirely forfeited, as they often are in the class action context.  
Because the full set of rights of publicity depicted are known to the 
committee, there is no need to impose deadlines in an effort to determine 
the class size or composition.  Compensation can (and should) also be 
calculated with no input from the rights holders, so the use of a deadline as 
a tool for the expedient release of information is also unnecessary in the 
FCLRRP context.  Unlike many areas of the law, there is no need for a 
statute of limitations defense or laches defense to prevent surprise to a 
defendant.  Since the developer will already be opting into the system, it 
will be aware of its liability from the outset.  Given these differences, 
                                                          
299.  See Direct Deposit and Royalty Thresholds, ASCAP (2015), 
http://ascap.com/members/payment/payment.aspx [http://perma.cc/4SDW-53QK]; see also 
General FAQ, supra note 248. 
 
300.  General FAQ, supra note 248.  
 
301.  Blair v. Nev. Landing P’ship, 859 N.E.2d 1188, 1193 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
 
302.  See id. at 1192 (dismissing a right of publicity case with prejudice because it was 
brought outside the statute of limitations); State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Found. v. 
Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 100 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (finding a defense of laches was a triable 
issue of fact for the jury in a right of publicity suit).  
 
303.  See Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1985) (barring a 
trademark claim after a ten-week delay under a laches theory).  But see Petrella v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1972 (2014) (ruling that the clearly defined statute of 
limitations for copyrights renders the laches defense inapplicable to copyright claims); see also 
Robert C. Scheinfeld, Laches in Trademark Infringement: How Long Can You Sleep on Rights?, 
251 N.Y. L.J. 1, 2 (2014). 
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payments should simply be held until they are claimed.  While a committee 
need not waste royalty funds searching for missing rights holders, there is 
little reason to penalize them for their delay. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The FCLRRP laid out in this article is a comprehensive proposal for a 
concrete problem.  Undoubtedly, it is imperfect.  But the perfect need not 
be the enemy of the good.  The precedents set by Hart and Keller mean that 
until there is a change in the law, video games that are desired by 
consumers and potentially profitable to developers and rights holders alike 
will not be produced.  This article’s compulsory regime would not only 
leave all parties better off but would also better effectuate the principles 
that underlie rights of publicity laws.  It does not reassign rights: it 
facilitates their exchange.  And while it may not be the only solution, it is 
the only one to date that proposes a change in the law that goes beyond 
simply legislating one of Hart and Keller’s dichotomous outcomes and 
further presents a detailed, fully actionable regime that fosters the 
production of creative works. 
 
